Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

were dangerously coupled with ineffective command
and control systems, poor communications, and interservice
coordination. There were also intelligence
support failings, failure of the global satellite navigation
system (GLONASS), and higher than anticipated
casualties partly as a result of problems with inadequate
Identification of Friend or Foe (IFF) equipment.
In August 2008, the independent Russian military
newspaper, Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, noted
that 60-75 percent of 58th Army tanks deployed in
Georgia were the old T-62, T-72M, and T-72BM, none
of which could withstand Georgian antitank warheads.
There was even controversy among the new weapons
that were being produced: when discussing the
new T-90 tank in July 2008, then commander-in-chief
of Ground Forces Army General Alexei Maslov openly
admitted that Russian tanks were lagging behind
other countries in the use of modern electronics. As he
put it, “although work to develop a tank battlefield information
management system is already under way,
its installation on outdated tank models is too costly
and therefore not recommended.” 58
One could go on, but the bottom line is that weapons
and equipment in the current Russian Army is
antiquated at best. In June 2009, the MoD stated that
“the outfitting of troops (forces) with arms and with
military and special equipment currently remains at
a level of from 60 to 100 percent, but the proportion
of modern models is around 10 percent.” 59 It will be
many years—perhaps not until 2020, a year often
suggested by Russian military analysts—before the
military that has been reduced to close to one million
personnel and is undergoing major structural changes
will have a relatively modern armed force once again.
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