Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

The Soviet and Russian Armed Forces have also
decreased their TNWs since the mid-1980s. The INF
Treaty required the Soviet Union to eliminate several
important medium-range missile systems, while the
PNI led to the destruction of many shorter-range systems.
During the early 1990s, the withdrawal of the
Russian Army from central Europe and the Russian
Navy from combat patrols also decreased Russian
military interest in nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The
severe problems experienced by the Russian defense
industry during this period also led the Russian Government
to concentrate Russia’s limited production
resources on higher-priority weapons, such as strategic
delivery systems and major conventional weapons
systems, though few of either was produced. But
toward the end of the decade, Moscow’s interest in
strengthening Russia’s nuclear forces, including those
having short ranges, increased. Russian policymakers
decided to retain many nonstrategic nuclear weapons
because they perceived them as a vital instrument
for preventing NATO, which was then expanding its
membership and engaging large and unprecedented
military operations in the former Yugoslavia, from exploiting
its conventional military superiority in a possible
war with Russia.
Even today, the Russian defense industry finds it
impossible to manufacture the large number of sophisticated
precision conventional weapons like those
produced by several NATO countries. 6 The Ministry
of Defense has also proved unable to transition the
Russian military to an entirely professional force of
long-term contract soldiers. Instead, it has had to keep
using large numbers of unmotivated, poorly trained,
but low-cost short-term Russian conscripts. 7 To make
up for the weaknesses of Russia’s conventional forces,
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