Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

such reluctance to reduce or eliminate Russian tactical
nuclear weapons (TNW) is less rooted in strategic
deterrence capabilities than either Russian politicians
or experts admit. The Defense Ministry’s 12th Main
Directorate (Glavnoye Upravleniye Ministerstvo Oborony—GUMO)
tasked with responsibility for nuclear
weapons, maintains that such weapons are needed in
the Kola Peninsula at naval facilities. Equally, it is fair
to say that within the Russian armed forces, the navy
is the main advocate of maintaining these capabilities,
since they are considered as a necessary part of confronting
the U.S. Navy in any conflict. In August 2009,
the naval main staff indicated that the role of TNW
was set to expand on attack nuclear submarines for
that very reason. 82 GUMO and the uniformed armed
forces, however, would place much greater currency
upon long-range systems, rather than on tactical
weapons when attempting to relate nuclear strategy
to actual military planning. As the Russian state seeks
to update and modernize its strategic nuclear forces
by 2020, many are expressing skepticism that this will
be fully implemented, not only owing to budgetary
setbacks, but also due to the ongoing design problems
experienced in connection with the Bulava submarine-launched
ballistic missile (SLBM). Nevertheless,
the political inertia and sensitivity surrounding the issue
of nonstrategic weapons has long resonance after
previous futile efforts to make progress on the issue.
While many have questioned the military value of
TNW, a belief in such military value most certainly
persists in the Russian strategic context, but primarily
in relation to China. This is due to several factors all
linked to Russian conventional weakness vis-à-vis the
PLA. In the first instance, in any military conflict the
Russian VVS cannot guarantee air superiority against
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