Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present, and Future - Strategic ...

• The General Staff wants to develop a new type
of officer, more akin to their western counterparts,
but presently lack any clearly defined
model for officer development.
• Corruption and ill-discipline has increased
since the reform began.
• The General Staff has identified that the mentality
of serving officers is the main stumbling
block in the path of officer reform.
• Russian operational-strategic exercises conducted
since the reform was launched confirm
that an unstated aim of the “new look” is the
adoption of network-centric warfare capabilities.
• Elements of testing network-centric command,
control, and communications (C 3 ) systems established
the need to adjust officer training and
exposed design flaws in the new technology.
• Exercises, however, remained mostly focused
on contact warfare, including both offensive
and defensive operations.
• Officers are now being rapidly taught the principles
and practical skills needed in order to
transition towards network-centric warfare.
• Weaknesses in tactical level capabilities were
also revealed and resulted in shifting the training
focus in 2010 towards improving individual
skills.
• The independence and capability of the “new
look” brigades are likely to be impaired for
many years by the slow rate of modernization
and by further efforts to improve the manning
system and reform the officer corps. 27
43