Educational Research - the Ethics and Aesthetics of Statistics

158 J.P. Van Bendegem et al.
10.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have merely initiated a train of thoughts about statistics, its ethics
and aesthetics, and its literacy. We still do not know whether we should take our
umbrella or not, but realising that we do not know seems to have some value in and
of itself. It indicates the borderlines where quantitative measures cease to have a
societal relevance, where the quantitative needs to be translated into the qualitative,
in this case, into the visual, and where access means relevant access.
Notes
1. This in itself is quite a tricky matter: some will claim that statistics can only be seen as applied
and that thus the phrase ‘statistics as a part of pure mathematics’ does not make sense. From
that perspective the combination of ethics and statistics as a branch of pure mathematics could
refer to the empty set. However, there is no unanimity on this question and so, as long as no
definite proof of emptiness has been produced, we consider the combination as meaningful.
An additional argument in favour of non-emptiness is the fact that statistics is part of the
classification scheme (section 62) of the American Mathematical Society and, in fact, the
first subsection is Foundational and Philosophical Topics (see http://www.ams.org/).
2. Unless, of course, one now sees probability theory as part of algebra. Talking about sigmaalgebras
and functions defined over such structures, satisfying certain conditions, often in the
forms of integrals, is quite a stretch away from statements such as ‘the probability to get a
3 with a fair dice is 1/6’. More specifically, Kolmogorov’s approach made it a lot easier to
deal with infinite cases. If one wonders whether this notion makes any sense, just think of a
rotating wheel and any question involving the probability of the angle of rotation, which is a
continuous, hence infinitely fine-grained variable.
3. So it is claimed by Heinrich Neider in his memories about Neurath. See Neurath and Cohen
(1973, p. 49).
4. It is, for example, quite curious that in the extensive and authoritative publications of Tufte
on visual representations of information (see Tufte, 1983, 1990, 1997) only in the third part
ISOTYPE is briefly mentioned and the name of Otto Neurath is lacking altogether.
5. In Neurath and Cohen (1973), Marie Neurath quotes from one of Otto Neurath’s papers on
ISOTYPE (pp. 224–248). So at least in 1973 it was known that some texts had to exist.
6. The example is taken from the text of Neurath himself (see Nemeth & Stadler, 1996, p. 330).
7. Here, we should allow room for discussion. It could be a drawing of a person standing still
in a framework of some kind (a scanner at an airport?), or of a person leaving or entering a
room, or it could be a still from a film. In that sense the figure is definitely ambiguous and
open to multiple interpretations.
8. Hoffmann (2007) in his article ‘Cognitive Conditions of Diagrammatic Reasoning’ offers a
very deep analysis of Plato’s case and the cognitive importance of diagrammatic reasoning.
9. These two figures have been taken from Hoffmann’s article (2007, pp. 15 and 20).
10. These two figures have been taken from the contribution of Angela Jansen in Nemeth and
Stadler (1996, pp. 147 and 148).
11. The name of the museum betrays Neurath’s interest in architecture. As it happens, Neurath
not only lectured at the Bauhaus and convinced Rudolf Carnap to do likewise, but he also
participated as non-architect – an adaptation of the statutes was required to allow for his
presence – in the CIAM (Congrès International d’Architecture Moderne), one of its founders
being Josef Frank, who was the brother of Philipp Frank, a member of the Wiener Kreis.
12. It is therefore in my view not surprising that one of the contributions to the ‘International
Encyclopaedia of Unified Science’ – or, to be more specific, the launching of the