learning-styles

LSRC reference Section 4
page 42/43
As adequate test reliability has not been established,
it is impossible to evaluate properly the many
published studies in which construct, concurrent
or predictive validity have been addressed. Riding
(2003b) takes issue with this point, claiming that
a test can be valid without being reliable. Yet he offers
no reasons for suggesting that the CSA is valid when
first administered, but not on later occasions. He
claims that the CSA asks people to do simple cognitive
tasks in a relaxed manner, so ensuring that they use
their natural or ‘default’ styles. A counter-argument
might be that people are often less relaxed in a new
test situation, when they do not know how difficult the
tasks will be.
The unreliability of the CSA may be one of the
reasons why correlations of the holist-analytic and
verbal-imagery ratios with other measures have often
been close to zero. Examples of this include Riding
and Wigley’s (1997) study of the relationship between
cognitive style and personality in FE students; the
study by Sadler-Smith, Allinson and Hayes (2000)
of the relationship between the holist-analytic
dimension of the CSA and the intuition-analysis
dimension of Allinson and Hayes’ Cognitive Style
Index (CSI), and Sadler-Smith and Riding’s (1999)
use of cognitive style to predict learning outcomes
on a university business studies course.
Evaluation
Despite the appeal of simplicity, there are unresolved
conceptual issues with Riding’s model and serious
problems with its accompanying test, the CSA.
Riding and Cheema (1991) argue that their
holist-analytic dimension can be identified under
different descriptors in many other typologies. However,
being relatively quick at recognising a rectangle hidden
in a set of superimposed outlines is not necessarily
linked with valuing conceptual or verbal accuracy
and detail, being a deep learner or having preference
for convergent or stepwise reasoning. Analysis can
mean different things at perceptual and conceptual
levels and in different domains, such as cognitive
and affective. In his taxonomy of educational objectives,
Bloom (1956) views analysis as a simpler process than
synthesis (which bears some resemblance to holistic
thinking). Riding takes a rather different view, seeing
holists as field-dependent and impulsive, unwilling
to engage in complex analytical tasks. Another point
of difference is that where Riding places analysis
and synthesis as polar opposites, Bloom sees them
as interdependent processes. We simply do not know
enough about the interaction and interdependence
of analytic and holistic thinking in different contexts
to claim that they are opposites.
There are also conceptual problems with the
verbaliser-imager dimension. Few tasks in everyday life
make exclusive demands on either verbal or non-verbal
processing, which are more often interdependent
or integrated aspects of thinking. While there is
convincing evidence from factor-analytic studies
of cognitive ability for individual differences in broad
and specific verbal and spatial abilities (eg Carroll
1993), this does not prove that people who are very
competent verbally (or spatially) tend consistently
to avoid other forms of thinking.
Further problems arise over the extent to which
styles are fixed. Riding’s definition of cognitive styles
refers to both preferred and habitual processes,
but he sees ‘default’ cognitive styles as incapable
of modification. Here he differs from other researchers
such as Vermunt (1996) and Antonietti (1999),
both of whom emphasise the role of metacognition
and of metacognitive training in modifying learning
styles. For Riding, metacognition includes an
awareness of cognitive styles and facilitates the
development of a repertoire of learning strategies
(not styles).
Riding seems to consider the ‘default’ position
as being constant, rather than variable. He has not
designed studies to look at the extent to which learners
are capable of moving up and down cognitive style
dimensions in accordance with task demands and
motivation. Although he cautions against the dangers
of labelling learners, he does not avoid this in his
own writing.
Turning now to the CSA instrument, there are problems
with basing the assessment of cognitive style on only
one or two tasks and in using an exclusively verbal
or non-verbal form of presentation for each dimension.
The onus must be on the test constructor to show
that consistent results are obtainable with different
types of task and with both verbal and non-verbal
presentation. There are also serious problems in basing
the assessment on a ratio measure, as two sources
of unreliability are present instead of one.
It is possible that the conceptual issues raised
above can be resolved, and that the construct validity
of Riding’s model of cognitive styles may eventually
prove more robust than the reliability of the CSA would
suggest. As Riding and Cheema (1991) argue, similar
dimensions or categories do appear in many other
typologies. However, as things stand, our impression
is that Riding has cast his net too wide and has
not succeeded in arriving at a classification of learning
styles that is consistent across tasks, consistent
across levels of task difficulty and complexity, and
independent of motivational and situational factors.