A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

4.7 Attestation Protocol
party that certies the security and reliability features of the device.
PPR-2 Attestation Mechanism: An attestation mechanism is implemented that provides
an eective assurance of the tamper-evidence and conformance with the evaluated
state of the smart card.
PPR-3 Authenticated & Valid CRP: To provide online device authentication and validation,
the card manufacturer maintains a valid CRP database corresponding to
individual smart cards.
PPR-4 Unique Identier: Each smart card has a unique identier that it can use to authenticate
itself to the card manufacturer.
PPR-5 Pseudo Public Identier: Each smart card has a dynamic pseudo public identier
that it uses to connect with the card manufacturer. Before issuing the smart cards
to individual users, the card manufacturer will generate a unique pseudo identity
for each card that will be updated on each successful execution of the attestation
protocol.
PPR-6 Smart Card Signature Key Pair: Each smart card will have a unique signature key
pair that is bound to the attestation mechanism.
PPR-7 Encryption & MAC Keys: The smart card manufacturer shares a unique encryption
and MAC key with each of their individual smart cards. These keys are used to
encrypt and MAC the communication messages between the smart card and its
manufacturer.
4.7.2 Protocol Goals
The goals for the attestation protocol are listed as below:
PG-1 Secrecy: During the attestation protocol, the communication messages are adequately
protected.
PG-2 Privacy: In the attestation protocol, the identity smart card owner (user) should
not be revealed to any eavesdropper or the card manufacturer.
4.7.3 Intruder's Capabilities
The aim of an adversary A could be to retrieve enough information to enable him to
successfully masquerade as a card manufacturer or as a smart card. Therefore, we assume
102