A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

C.3 Attestation Protocol
460 i n b u f f l e n g t h , Key kpSign , short signMode ) {
461 i f ( signMode == S i g n a t u r e .MODE_SIGN) {
462 copyPointer = U t i l . arrayCopyNonAtomic ( this . SignedDataTag , ( short ) 0 ,
463 this . r e c e i v i n g B u f f e r , copyPointer , ( short )
464 this . SignedDataTag . l e n g t h ) ;
465 copyPointer += ( short ) 2 ;
466 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPrivateKey ) kpSign , S i g n a t u r e .MODE_SIGN) ;
467 s i g n l e n g t h = phSign . s i g n ( i n b u f f , ( short ) i n b u f f O f f s e t , i n b u f f l e n g t h ,
468 i n b u f f , copyPointer ) ;
469 this . shortToBytes ( this . r e c e i v i n g B u f f e r , ( short ) ( copyPointer −
( short )
470 2) , s i g n l e n g t h ) ;
471 copyPointer += s i g n l e n g t h ;
472 return true ;
473 } else i f ( signMode == S i g n a t u r e .MODE_VERIFY) {
474 phSign . i n i t ( ( RSAPublicKey ) kpSign , S i g n a t u r e .MODE_VERIFY) ;
475 return phSign . v e r i f y ( i n b u f f , i n b u f f O f f s e t , i n b u f f l e n g t h , i n b u f f ,
476 ( short ) ( i n b u f f O f f s e t + i n b u f f l e n g t h +
477 this . PTLVDataOffset ) , ( short ) 64) ;
478 }
479 return f a l s e ;
480 }
481 public s t a t i c short bytesToShort ( byte [ ] ArrayBytes ) {
482 return ( short ) ( ( ( ArrayBytes [ 0 ]
( short )
491 0 x0008 ) ;
492 Array [ ( short ) ( a r r a y O f f s e t + ( short ) 1) ] = ( byte ) ( inShort & ( short )
493 0x00FF ) ;
494 }
495 }
C.3.2
Card Manufacturer Implementation
Following is the card manufacturer's implementation of the attestation protocol and to
accomplish its operations it uses helper functions detailed in appendices C.11.1 and C.11.2.
1 package j a v a c a r d t e r m i n a l ;
2
3 import java . u t i l . Arrays ;
4 import java . s e c u r i t y . i n t e r f a c e s . RSAPublicKey ;
5 import java . s e c u r i t y . spec . RSAPublicKeySpec ;
6 import java . s e c u r i t y . ∗ ;
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