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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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7.4 Application Binding Protocol Local<br />

7.4.2 Protocol Description<br />

The aim of the Application-Binding Protocol Local (ABPL) is to facilitate both the<br />

client and server applications on the same device to authenticate each other and verify their<br />

current states to be secure. The ABPL also enables applications to establish the application<br />

binding <strong>for</strong> future communications. The ABPL message description is as below:<br />

ABPL-1. CL : IMA CL = e KCL−T EM<br />

(CL i ||SE i ||N CL )<br />

CL → F : CL i ||SE i ||Sign CL (CL i ||SE i ||N CL ||IMA CL )||CertS CL<br />

The request message contains the identities of the client and server applications together<br />

with a random number generated by the CL. In addition, the client application creates an<br />

IMA message (section 7.3.2) <strong>for</strong> the T EM. The client application signs the message and<br />

appends its certicate.<br />

ABPL-2. F → SE : CL i ||SE i ||Sign CL (CL i ||SE i ||N CL ||IMA CL )||CertS CL<br />

The rewall F receives the application-binding request and it will query the SE. If the<br />

server application wants to proceed with the ABPL, it <strong>for</strong>wards the message; otherwise, it<br />

registers an exception.<br />

ABPL-3. SE : IMA SE = e KSE−T EM<br />

(SE i ||CL i ||N SE )<br />

SE → T EM : CL i ||SE i ||IMA CL ||IMA SE<br />

The SE veries the client's signature. If successful, it generates an IMA message <strong>for</strong> the<br />

CL. The SE then sends the message to the T EM that contains the identities and IMA<br />

messages of both the CL and SE.<br />

ABPL-4. T EM → SL : V RE CL = e KCL−T EM<br />

(h(SE)||K t SE−CL ||N CL + 1)<br />

T EM → SE : V RE SE = e KSE−T EM<br />

(h(CL)||K t SE−CL ||N SE + 1)<br />

The T EM veries the IMA messages from both the CL and SE. Then it will calculate<br />

the hash value of the SE, encrypt it with the shared key K CL−T EM and send it to the CL.<br />

Similarly, the TEM will calculate the hash value of the CL, encrypt it with the shared<br />

key K SE−T EM and send it to the SE. The encrypted messages also contain a session key<br />

generated by the T EM; this key is valid only during the ABPL run.<br />

ABPL-5. SE : skm = e K t<br />

SE−CL<br />

(e SE−CL ||N CL + 2||N SE )<br />

SE : au = e KSE−CL (AP ||OR||N CL ||N SE )<br />

SE : tc = Sign SE (SE i ||CL i ||N SE ||au)<br />

SE → CL : SE i ||CL i ||IMA CL ||skm||tc||CertS SE<br />

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