A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

B.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol Service Provider
3. SC -> CM : {ns,nm,nsp,response}{sKey}
4. CM -> SC : {ns,{CM,SC,ns,nsp}{Skey{CM}}}{sKey}
#Actual variables
SmartCard, CardManufacturer, MAppl : Agent
Ns, Nsp, Nt, Nm, Challenge, Response : Nonce
SIDOne, SIDTwo : Num
#Processes
INITIATOR(SC, CM, ns, nsp, response) knows sKey, VKey
RESPONDER(CM, SC, nm, challenge) knows sKey, SKey(CM), VKey
#System
INITIATOR(SmartCard, CardManufacturer, Ns, Nsp, Response)
RESPONDER(CardManufacturer, SmartCard, Nm, Challenge)
#Functions
symbolic VKey, SKey
#Intruder Information
Intruder = MAppl
IntruderKnowledge = {SmartCard, CardManufacturer, MAppl, MAppl, Nm, Nsp, SKey(MAppl),
VKey}
#Specification
StrongSecret(SC, sKey, [CM])
StrongSecret(SC, response, [CM])
Aliveness(SC, CM)
Aliveness(CM, SC)
B.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol Service Provider
The Casper script in this section corresponds to the Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol
Service Provider (STCP SP ) described in section 6.3.
#Free variables
datatype Field = Gen | Exp(Field, Num) unwinding 2
halfkeySP, halfkeyTPM, sessionKey : Field
SP, TPM : Agent
ns, nt, nm, scos, app : Nonce
s, t : Num
VKey: Agent -> PublicKey
SKey: Agent -> SecretKey
EKey: Agent -> PublicKey
DKey: Agent -> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (sessionKey, sessionKey),(VKey, SKey),(EKey, DKey),(Exp, Exp),(Gen, Gen)
#Protocol description
0. -> SP : TPM
1. SP -> TPM : SP, VKey(SP)
2. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, nt}{VKey(SP)}
2a. TPM -> SP : {Exp(Gen, t) % halfkeyTPM}{VKey(SP)}
243