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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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3.5 <strong>Security</strong> and Operational Requirements of the UCOM<br />

3.5.2 Cardholder's Requirements<br />

A cardholder is an entity that uses a smart card to access authorised services. In the<br />

UCOM, the control of a smart card is with its user. There<strong>for</strong>e, cardholders have complete<br />

control over the choice of applications on their smart cards. They will have the exibility<br />

to change the installed applications on their smart cards. Furthermore, they could install<br />

or delete any applications they are entitled to at their convenience. The framework will<br />

provide the mechanism that ensures the secure control and the ubiquitous management of<br />

applications on smart cards. A cardholder's requirements in UCOM are listed below:<br />

CR1. <strong>Security</strong>: If a smart card is inherently insecure, or if it becomes vulnerable to new<br />

threats, it can aect the security of applications installed on the card. We cannot<br />

expect that each cardholder is technically capable of ensuring and managing the<br />

security of the smart card; there<strong>for</strong>e, a cardholder would require an assurance that<br />

the card plat<strong>for</strong>m will be secure and reliable even if it is in the possession of an<br />

illiterate or malicious user.<br />

CR2. Privacy: Applications installed on a smart card represent the identities of the<br />

cardholder in dierent contexts. For example a college card, a health card and a<br />

credit card represent a cardholder's identity as a student, a patient, and a consumer<br />

respectively. These identities are in the <strong>for</strong>m of applications that have some unique<br />

characteristics (e.g. student ID, patient ID, and Primary Account Number: PAN)<br />

to identify a particular user. There<strong>for</strong>e, applications on a smart card can be treated<br />

as the identities of the cardholder. In the ICOM, these identities may not have any<br />

connections with each other. However, in the UCOM, any or all of these identities<br />

could be on the same card, creating a privacy issue if one application becomes aware<br />

of the existence of others on a smart card. There<strong>for</strong>e, the identities on a particular<br />

card should not have any links between them. For example, a college application<br />

should not be able to nd out about a medical application(s) installed on the same<br />

card.<br />

CR3. Least Interaction (Seamless Framework): Most users do not understand the<br />

technology behind a particular product (i.e. mobile phone applications). There<strong>for</strong>e,<br />

the framework should not be based on the assumption that an average user can<br />

per<strong>for</strong>m technically challenging tasks. The UCOM should be seamless and should<br />

per<strong>for</strong>m all necessary tasks by itself, and only involve the user when required.<br />

CR4. Interoperability: The smart card user will not want to buy a separate smart card<br />

<strong>for</strong> each application. Smart card suppliers should provide cards that support most<br />

of the available functionalities and SPs should oer applications in many <strong>for</strong>mats to<br />

support as many dierent execution environments as possible.<br />

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