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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism<br />

In Multos, application delegation is implemented to enable application resource sharing.<br />

The application that initiates the process is called the delegator and the application that<br />

is initiated is called the delegate. The process of delegation works as described below and<br />

shown in gure 7.2:<br />

Application A<br />

(Delegator)<br />

Multos Firewall<br />

Application B<br />

(Delegate)<br />

Public Memory (RAM)<br />

4<br />

1<br />

Command APDU<br />

INS<br />

CLA<br />

P1<br />

P2<br />

Lc<br />

Le<br />

Data<br />

SW1<br />

SW2<br />

Data<br />

Response<br />

APDU<br />

2<br />

3<br />

Figure 7.2: The Multos card rewall mechanism<br />

1. Application A (delegator) creates an APDU in the public memory and invokes the<br />

delegate command. The APDU consists of application B's AID, requested data or<br />

function and the delegator's AID.<br />

2. The Multos COS initiates the execution of B that looks <strong>for</strong> the APDU in the public<br />

memory. It reads the APDU and processes it.<br />

3. On completion, B creates a response APDU within the public memory.<br />

4. The Multos COS switches back to A that then retrieves B's APDU.<br />

7.2.3 Rationale <strong>for</strong> <strong>User</strong> <strong>Centric</strong> Smart Card Firewall<br />

Traditional smart card rewall mechanisms are t-<strong>for</strong>-purpose in the ICOM environment<br />

but they do not provide adequate security to the UCTD environment. The operational<br />

and security requirements a UCOM rewall has to satisfy are:<br />

FiR-1 No O-card <strong>Security</strong> Assumption: The rewall mechanisms discussed in previous<br />

sections are designed with the implicit assumption that the smart card will be under<br />

the card issuer's control. The security of the plat<strong>for</strong>m is ensured not only by the oncard<br />

mechanisms but most importantly by the o-card agreements, which prevent<br />

installation of a malicious application and prevent unauthorised application access.<br />

161

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