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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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6.7 Summary<br />

For the STCP ACA , we need to provide the digest of the downloaded application. To do this<br />

we emulated the per<strong>for</strong>mance measure by monitoring the time it took to generate hash on<br />

a 256 bytes array. The hash generation on the 256 bytes took 31 milliseconds on the test<br />

smart cards. The per<strong>for</strong>mance measures of hash generation on the test smart cards with<br />

dierent sizes of the download application are shown in gure 6.2<br />

Time (Miliseconds)<br />

11000<br />

10000<br />

9000<br />

8000<br />

7000<br />

6000<br />

5000<br />

4000<br />

3000<br />

2000<br />

1000<br />

0<br />

1 17 33 49 65 81 97 113 129 145 161 177 193 209 225 241<br />

Input Data (Kilobytes)<br />

Figure 6.2: Per<strong>for</strong>mance measurements of hash generation on test smart cards<br />

The STCP ACA can be divided in to three distinct phases that are listed in the table 6.4<br />

along with the breakdown of the per<strong>for</strong>mance measure. The breakdown provides a rough<br />

guide how much extra time these protocols will take if the protocols STCP SC and STCP SP<br />

are extended to provide SOG-18 and SOG-19.<br />

Table 6.4: Breakdown of per<strong>for</strong>mance measurement (milliseconds) of the STCP ACA<br />

Phases<br />

Measures<br />

STCP ACA<br />

C1 C2<br />

AKA Phase (STCP ACA -1 4) Average 3182 3334<br />

Contract Phase (STCP ACA -5 6) Average 1253 1294<br />

Charge Phase (STCP ACA -7 8) Average 1407 1470<br />

Total (STCP ACA -1 8) Average 5843 6098<br />

The per<strong>for</strong>mance measures are only <strong>for</strong> the reference of our implementation, as the actual<br />

per<strong>for</strong>mance will vary depending the attestation process, the application size, and the<br />

communication speed (i.e. Internet bandwidth).<br />

6.7 Summary<br />

In this chapter, we discussed Secure Channel Protocols (SCPs) and their role in the UCTD.<br />

In addition, we provided the rationale behind proposing new SCPs. This was followed by<br />

an account of the related work in the eld. We discussed security and operational goals<br />

<strong>for</strong> the proposed protocols. We then proposed three protocols that satisfy varying levels<br />

of security and operational goals, along with the user's and SP's requirements. These<br />

protocols were then analysed in<strong>for</strong>mally <strong>for</strong> a limited set of security goals and compared<br />

with a set of selected protocols. We subjected the proposed protocols to mechanical <strong>for</strong>mal<br />

155

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