A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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Contents 1 Introduction 18 1.1 Setting the Scene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1.2 A Brief History of Smart Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 1.3 Motivation and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 1.4 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 1.5 Structure of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 2 User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device 31 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.2 Rationale for a User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.2.1 Smart Card Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 2.2.2 Hand-held Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 2.2.3 Traditional Computing Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2.3 Candidates for User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 2.3.1 Trusted Platform Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.3.2 AEGIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.3.3 ARM TrustZone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 2.3.4 M-Shield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 2.3.5 GlobalPlatform Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) . . . . . . . 39 2.3.6 Trusted Personal Devices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2.3.7 Comparative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2.4 The User Centric Tamper-Resistant Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 2.4.1 Smart Card Management Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 2.4.2 User Centricity in the Smart Card Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 2.5 Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2.5.1 One Card - All Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 2.5.2 Authentication Gateway (Single Sign On) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 2.5.3 E-Commerce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 2.5.4 Online Gaming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3 Smart Card Ownership Models 51 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 3.2.1 Advantages of the ICOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 3.2.2 Drawbacks of the ICOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 3.3.1 Multos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 3.3.2 Java Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3.3.3 GlobalPlatform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 3.3.4 Other Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 3.4 User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 8
CONTENTS 3.4.1 Supplier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 3.4.2 Cardholder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 3.4.3 User Centric Smart Card (UCSC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 3.4.4 Card Application Management Software (CAMS) . . . . . . . . . . . 68 3.4.5 Host Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 3.4.6 Service Provider (SP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 3.4.7 Service Access Point (SAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 3.5 Security and Operational Requirements of the UCOM . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 3.5.1 General Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 3.5.2 Cardholder's Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 3.5.3 User Centric Smart Card's Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 3.5.4 Service Provider's Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 3.6 Coopetitive Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 4 User Centric Smart Card Architecture 79 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4.2 Platform Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4.2.1 Spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 4.2.2 Card Security Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 4.2.3 Card Services Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 4.2.4 Cardholder's Security Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 4.2.5 Subscription Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 4.3 Trusted Environment & Execution Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 4.3.1 Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 4.3.2 Backup Token Handler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 4.3.3 Runtime Security Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 4.3.4 Attestation Handler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 4.3.5 Self-test Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 4.4 Security Assurance and Validation Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 4.4.1 Common Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 4.4.2 Assurance Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 4.4.3 Validation Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 4.5 Attestation Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 4.5.1 Non-simulatable PUFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 4.5.2 Pseudorandom Number Generator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 4.5.3 Challenge-Response Pair Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 4.6 Device Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 4.6.1 Administrative Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 4.6.2 User Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 4.6.3 Ownership Acquisition & Delegation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 4.6.4 Key Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 4.7 Attestation Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 4.7.1 Protocol Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 4.7.2 Protocol Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 4.7.3 Intruder's Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 4.7.4 Protocol Notation and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 4.7.5 Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 4.8 Protocol Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 4.8.1 Informal Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 9
Page 1 and 2: A User Centric Security Model for T
Page 3 and 4: Declaration These doctoral studies
Page 5 and 6: R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, and
Page 7: Abstract In this thesis we propose
Page 11 and 12: CONTENTS 7 Application Sharing Mech
Page 13 and 14: CONTENTS C.4 Secure and Trusted Cha
Page 15 and 16: LIST OF FIGURES 8.6 Control ow diag
Page 17 and 18: List of Abbreviations AAC Applicati
Page 19 and 20: 1.1 Setting the Scene 1.1 Setting t
Page 21 and 22: 1.2 A Brief History of Smart Cards
Page 23 and 24: 1.3 Motivation and Challenges Over
Page 25 and 26: 1.3 Motivation and Challenges compu
Page 27 and 28: 1.4 Contributions the UCTD manufact
Page 29 and 30: 1.5 Structure of the Thesis traditi
Page 31 and 32: Chapter 2 User Centric Tamper-Resis
Page 33 and 34: 2.2 Rationale for a User Centric Ta
Page 35 and 36: 2.2 Rationale for a User Centric Ta
Page 37 and 38: 2.3 Candidates for User Centric Tam
Page 43 and 44: Businesses Governments Privacy Pres
Page 45 and 46: 2.4 The User Centric Tamper-Resista
Page 47 and 48: 2.5 Case Studies an enrolment proce
Page 49 and 50: 2.5 Case Studies issued the applica
Page 51 and 52: Chapter 3 Smart Card Ownership Mode
Page 53 and 54: 3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Owner
Page 55 and 56: 3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Owner
Page 57 and 58: 3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM which i
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM Applica
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM which i
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM Element
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3.4 User Centric Smart Card Ownersh
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3.5 Security and Operational Requir
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Service Provider 3.6 Coopetitive Ar
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Chapter 4 User Centric Smart Card A
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4.2 Platform Architecture Platform
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4.2 Platform Architecture manager c
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4.3 Trusted Environment & Execution
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4.4 Security Assurance and Validati
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms 4.5 Atte
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms rational
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms otherwis
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4.6 Device Ownership 4.6.2 User Own
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4.7 Attestation Protocol can succes
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4.7 Attestation Protocol an adversa
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4.7 Attestation Protocol SC i ′ a
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4.8 Protocol Analysis CasperFDR app
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4.9 Summary whereas the online atte
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5.1 Introduction 5.1 Introduction E
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5.2 GlobalPlatform Card Management
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5.3 Multos Card Management Framewor
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5.4 Proposed Smart Card Management
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5.4 Proposed Smart Card Management
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5.5 Card Management-Related Issues
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Chapter 6 Secure and Trusted Channe
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols 6.2 Se
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols smart
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols SOG-16
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols Notati
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6.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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6.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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6.5 Application Acquisition and Con
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6.6 Analysis of the Proposed Protoc
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6.7 Summary For the STCP ACA , we n
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Chapter 7 Application Sharing Mecha
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism 7
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism I
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism a
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7.3 UCTD Firewall utilises CDAM to
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7.3 UCTD Firewall application. Ther
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7.3 UCTD Firewall 7.3.6 Cross-Devic
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7.3 UCTD Firewall and asynchronous
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7.3 UCTD Firewall Table 7.2: Protoc
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7.4 Application Binding Protocol L
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7.5 Platform Binding Protocol The r
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7.6 Application Binding Protocol D
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Chapter 8 Smart Card Runtime Enviro
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8.2 Smart Card Runtime Environment
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism In
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism it
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism er
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism id
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism Th
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8.4 Analysis of the Runtime Protect
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8.4 Analysis of the Runtime Protect
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8.5 Summary representation; the abs
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Chapter 9 Backup, Migration, and De
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9.2 Backup and Migration Framework
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9.2 Backup and Migration Framework
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9.3 Application Deletion tion of th
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9.3 Application Deletion The deleti
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9.3 Application Deletion authorises
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9.5 Summary 9.5 Summary In this cha
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10.1 Summary and Conclusions 10.1 S
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10.1 Summary and Conclusions giving
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10.2 Recommendations for Future Wor
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Appendix A Description of Protocols
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A.3 Aziz-Die (AD) Protocol on the p
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A.5 Just-Fast-Keying (JFK) Protocol
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A.8 Markantonakis-Mayes (MM) Protoc
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A.9 Sirett-Mayes-Markantonakis (SM)
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B.1 Brief Introduction to the Caspe
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B.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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B.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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B.6 Application Binding Protocol L
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B.7 Platform Binding Protocol B.7 P
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B.8 Application Binding Protocol D
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism C.1
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 93 (
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 194
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 47 (
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 148
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C.2 Online Attestation Mechanism C.
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C.2 Online Attestation Mechanism 10
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 15 import
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 112 f a l
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 214 } 215
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 312 inLeng
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 410 this .
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 7 import j
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 107 this .
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 204 ( this
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 302 } 303
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C.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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C.6 Application Acquisition and Con
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C.7 Application Binding Protocol -
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 17 im
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 119 p
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 221 i
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 323 c
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 424 +
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 524 S
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 47 (
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 149 J
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 350 +
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 451 p
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 552 r
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C.10 Abstract Virtual Machine 42 "
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C.11 Implementation Helper Classes
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BIBLIOGRAPHY August 2009, pp. 2035.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Available: http://www.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Institute of Technolog
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Available: http://csrc
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