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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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7.1 Introduction<br />

7.1 Introduction<br />

Multi-application smart cards enable the co-existence of interrelated and cooperative applications<br />

that augment each other's functionality. This enables applications to share their<br />

data as well as their functionality with other applications, achieving optimised memory<br />

usage, and data and service sharing between applications [14].<br />

A major concern arising from application sharing mechanisms is the possibility of unauthorised<br />

inter-application communication. A framework that ensures that application sharing<br />

is secure and reliable even in adverse conditions (i.e. malicious applications, developer's<br />

mistakes, or design oversight, etc.) is referred as a smart card rewall [185]. In this chapter,<br />

the terms rewall and smart card rewall are used interchangeably.<br />

The dynamic and decentralised nature of the UCOM may lead to unauthorised application<br />

communication and the associated privacy concerns. Existing techniques deployed by the<br />

smart card industry are not adequate to provide security and reliability to the application<br />

sharing mechanism on a user centric device. The issues involved are: a) an inability to<br />

dynamically authenticate an application on a smart card, b) diculty in ascertaining the<br />

security and reliability of the current state of an application, c) an inability to verify and<br />

restrict application sharing (privilege-based access), d) no provision <strong>for</strong> privacy preservation<br />

<strong>for</strong> cardholders, and e) no cryptographic binding between applications. There<strong>for</strong>e, in this<br />

chapter, we discuss the proposed rewall mechanism [186] that provides an extension to<br />

the traditional mechanisms deployed in Multos and Java Card, in order to deal with the<br />

listed issues.<br />

There may also be a requirement to allow applications executing on dierent UCTDs to<br />

intercommunicate. Thereby, we further extend the architecture of the proposed rewall<br />

[186] to accommodate application sharing among applications that are installed on dierent<br />

UCTDs. This extension is referred as the Cross-Device Application Sharing Mechanism<br />

(CDAM).<br />

To meet the requirements <strong>for</strong> a UCOM rewall mechanism, we propose three protocols,<br />

analyse them against a predened set of stated goals, validate them using mechanical<br />

<strong>for</strong>mal analysis using CasperFDR, and nally describe a prototype implementation and<br />

per<strong>for</strong>mance measurements.<br />

Structure of the Chapter: Section 7.2 discusses the application sharing mechanisms<br />

deployed by Java Card and Multos, along with the rationale behind the proposal <strong>for</strong> a<br />

UCOM rewall mechanism. In section 7.3, we describe the architecture of the proposed<br />

rewall mechanism. To provide entity authentication, application state assurance, and<br />

secure application binding we propose an Application Binding Protocol (ABP) in section<br />

158

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