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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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3.5 <strong>Security</strong> and Operational Requirements of the UCOM<br />

SPR3. Maintenance <strong>Security</strong>: SPs require access privileges <strong>for</strong> their applications to<br />

update application data les or to update the applications themselves. This access<br />

to the application should be secure, and it should not involve cardholders. However,<br />

if the SP desires, the cardholder's consent can also be requested <strong>for</strong> application<br />

update/modication processes.<br />

SPR4. Intellectual Property Protection: In the UCOM, SPs lease their applications<br />

to the user's smart card. A malicious user can simulate a smart card on a device<br />

(e.g. computer) and then request the application from an SP. If the SP leases the<br />

application to a simulated environment, the malicious user can reverse engineer the<br />

application. This could reveal the secret in<strong>for</strong>mation (e.g. cryptographic keys, and<br />

algorithms) contained in the application. There<strong>for</strong>e, SPs require that adequate security<br />

protection is implemented to safeguard their condentiality and integrity of<br />

their applications.<br />

SPR5. Application Code Condentiality: The applications from SPs would need to<br />

comply with certain standards. However, these standards will not prevent them from<br />

using proprietary algorithms. The SPs would require that the code of their applications<br />

and its inner workings should remain condential. The smart card provides<br />

adequate security to prevent an adversary from gaining knowledge of the SP's application.<br />

Application Code Condentiality will be jointly provided by mechanisms<br />

that satisfy the abovementioned requirements.<br />

SPR6. Application Control: In the UCOM, although users own the smart cards, the<br />

ownership of the application still resides with the SP. SPs only lease applications to<br />

their customers (UCSCs). The SP has the power to revoke the application lease, or<br />

to block or modify the application. The lease of an application is governed by the<br />

ALP. In addition, the SP controls all operations that a cardholder can request on<br />

its smart card. These operations are application installation, application deletion,<br />

and state change (i.e. application block and unblock operations), and they cannot be<br />

per<strong>for</strong>med unless authorised by the relevant application's SP.<br />

SPR7. Protection Against Monopolies: In the UCOM, multiple applications may be<br />

installed on a smart card from dierent SPs. They all share and use the same smart<br />

card hardware and card operating system. There is a possibility that a smart card<br />

operating system can favour certain applications. As a result, these applications can<br />

monopolise the card. There<strong>for</strong>e, SPs will require assurances that such scenarios will<br />

not be possible.<br />

SPR8. Ease of Implementation: SPs have made substantial investments to their existing<br />

infrastructure that provides services to their customers. There<strong>for</strong>e, the UCOM<br />

should not impose unnecessary changes to the existing infrastructure. The basic idea<br />

is to implement the UCOM as another layer on top of the existing infrastructure,<br />

which implements UCOM without extensive modication.<br />

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