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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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5.2 GlobalPlat<strong>for</strong>m Card Management Framework<br />

5.2 GlobalPlat<strong>for</strong>m Card Management Framework<br />

In this section we discuss the GlobalPlat<strong>for</strong>m card management framework along with how<br />

it supports TSM-based card management.<br />

5.2.1 Architecture Overview<br />

The GlobalPlat<strong>for</strong>m card security requirement specication [1], species nine entities that<br />

per<strong>for</strong>m various tasks in the overall card management architecture. The overall architecture<br />

is depicted in gure 5.1, which is a simplistic representation of the architecture described<br />

in [1]. The gure is then explained.<br />

Card Issued<br />

Cardholder<br />

Smart Card<br />

Provide Cards,<br />

Plat<strong>for</strong>m data and keys<br />

Application Load/Delete<br />

Confirmation<br />

Application<br />

Loader<br />

Request<br />

Plat<strong>for</strong>m<br />

Code<br />

Card Issuer<br />

SCOS Developer<br />

Set Policies<br />

Plat<strong>for</strong>m Code<br />

Provide Enabled Cards<br />

Card<br />

Administrator<br />

Application Installation<br />

Deletion Authority<br />

Card Enabler<br />

Provide <strong>Security</strong><br />

Domain Keys and data<br />

Application<br />

Load/Delete<br />

Confirmation<br />

Application<br />

Provider<br />

Request Offcard<br />

Application Code Verification<br />

Application, Keys, and<br />

Personalisation Data<br />

Application<br />

Load Permission<br />

Code Verification Report<br />

Figure 5.1: GlobalPlat<strong>for</strong>m card management architecture [1]<br />

Controlling<br />

Authority<br />

Request Application<br />

Load<br />

Verification<br />

Authority<br />

The shaded entities in gure 5.1 have dierent titles and roles, but together they <strong>for</strong>m<br />

the card issuer as dened in this thesis. The term card issuer as dened by GlobalPlat<strong>for</strong>m<br />

in [1] is restrictive, so that they only have the responsibility to acquire the smart<br />

cards, set security policy, and issue them to individual cardholders. The card administrator<br />

then manages the cards once they are issued to individual customers. If application<br />

providers want to issue their applications, they rst have to get the applications veried<br />

by the verication authority. The verication authority per<strong>for</strong>ms an o-card application<br />

code verication to ascertain whether the given code con<strong>for</strong>ms to the security policy set by<br />

the card issuer. Once the verication is per<strong>for</strong>med, the application provider requests the<br />

controlling authority to give permission to load the application. The controlling authority<br />

checks the verication authority's verication and issues the permission to load the application.<br />

Now, if the application is going to be loaded at the pre-issuance stage then the<br />

domain keys and data will be sent to the card issuer [157] through the card enabler. Otherwise,<br />

the domain keys and data will be sent to the application loader. In gure 5.1, we<br />

112

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