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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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5.3 Multos Card Management Framework<br />

a signature key pair and application code; the private key of the application provider along<br />

with the application code is securely communicated to the application load unit generator.<br />

The signature key is used to generate a cryptographically protected application load unit<br />

(i.e. downloadable application). The application provider will also send its signature verication<br />

key and application to the card issuer, which <strong>for</strong>wards it to the Multos Certication<br />

Authority (M-CA). The application header is a data structure that contains in<strong>for</strong>mation<br />

regarding the respective application, which includes the application identity, hash of the<br />

application code, and code and data size [159]. The M-CA can be either the card manufacturer,<br />

or an authorised entity of the Multos consortium [29]. The role of the M-CA is to<br />

issue an application load or delete certicate to the card issuer <strong>for</strong> the application. In addition,<br />

the M-CA also provides the list of public keys <strong>for</strong> individual Multos cards that the<br />

card issuer has issued to its customers. This list of public keys is stored by the application<br />

load unit generator as the keys are used to encrypt individual applications. This transfer<br />

of public keys is marked as user personalisation data in gure 5.2. The application load<br />

unit generator will create individual application load units <strong>for</strong> individual smart cards, if<br />

the load unit has to be encrypted. Finally the load unit will have a signed digest of the<br />

application, using the application provider's signature key and if required the application<br />

encrypted by the respective smart card's public key. The application load facility now<br />

has the application load units and associated M-CA's issued certicates that it will use to<br />

download the application to individual smart cards.<br />

As it is apparent from gure 5.2 that application providers have to communicate their<br />

application (in plaintext) and private key to the application load unit generator (i.e. card<br />

issuer). Furthermore, the application management tasks (i.e. installation, deletion, and<br />

updating etc.) have to be per<strong>for</strong>med through the card issuer and/or M-CA. Unlike the<br />

GlobalPlat<strong>for</strong>m, Multos specications do not provide independent application management<br />

architecture. To delete an application, the process is similar to the Multos application<br />

installation except there is no need to generate the application load unit only an application<br />

delete certicate that is similar to application load certicate is required from the<br />

M-CA.<br />

5.3.2 Support <strong>for</strong> Trusted Service Manager Architecture<br />

To date we have not seen any ocial proposal on how to incorporate Multos into the<br />

proposed TSM architecture <strong>for</strong> NFC mobile phones. However, in a centralised environment<br />

a TSM can take the role of the M-CA and application load unit generator.<br />

115

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