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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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4.4 <strong>Security</strong> Assurance and Validation Mechanism<br />

evaluation-standard of choice. CC evaluation has a well-established security requirement<br />

specication [69] and evaluation methodology [130]. Furthermore, card issuers, application<br />

providers, and most smart card manufacturers have extensive experience of the CC<br />

evaluation scheme.<br />

In subsequent sections, we discuss how CC plays the role of trusted third party (evaluator)<br />

in the UCOM security assurance and validation process.<br />

4.4.2 Assurance Phase<br />

This section describes the pre-issuance security evaluation. It is divided into two subsections:<br />

smart card evaluation and application evaluation.<br />

4.4.2.1 Smart Card Evaluation<br />

In this phase, the card manufacturer would get their smart cards evaluated to the dened<br />

EAL. If the evaluation of the smart card is successful, the CC Certication Body (CB)<br />

would issue a cryptographic certicate [132], referred to as the Plat<strong>for</strong>m Assurance Certicate<br />

(PAC). The main components of the certicate include a PAC identier, a unique<br />

reference to the product's ST, PP, and list of hardware security mechanisms and a hash of<br />

the immutable (security and reliability critical) part of the SCOS.<br />

Smart cards could be subjected to extensive evaluation by the manufacturer, evaluation<br />

labs, or the academic community even after the issuance of the card's PAC; there<strong>for</strong>e, if<br />

such evaluations discover vulnerabilities in a particular product, SPs can disable their application<br />

leases to them, preventing the smart cards from accessing the sanctioned services.<br />

Furthermore, the CB may downgrade their PAC assurance level or include the card on a<br />

certication revocation list, prohibiting such smart cards from downloading applications<br />

in the future.<br />

In addition, a PAC can also have the manufacturer's ID, the evaluator's (Commercial<br />

Licensed Evaluation Facility: CLEF) ID, the manufacturer's signature verication key<br />

[132], and the validity period. The validity period is determined by the CC evaluators<br />

and it represents an estimated period that a given product is expected to remain secure.<br />

The manufacturer's ID uniquely identies the smart card manufacturer, and similarly the<br />

CLEF ID identies the evaluation body that has carried out the evaluation. Finally, the<br />

certicate would also certify the manufacturer's signature key pair.<br />

The manufacturer would use the signature key certied by the PAC to issue certicates to<br />

91

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