A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

B.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol Smart Card
3. SP -> TPM : {SP, TPM, ns}{EKey(TPM)}
3a. SP -> TPM : {Exp(Gen, s) % halfkeySP}{EKey(TPM)}
4. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, {scos (+) ns}{SKey(TPM)}}{sessionKey}
5. SP -> TPM : {SP, TPM, nt}{sessionKey}
6. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, {app (+) ns}{SKey(TPM)}}{sessionKey}
#Actual variables
SerPro, TruPlaMan, MAppl : Agent
Nsp, Ntpm, Nm : Nonce
SCOS, APP : Nonce
S, T, M : Num
SCOperatingSys, SApplication : Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR(SP, TPM, ns, s, app, scos) knows SKey(SP), DKey(SP), VKey, EKey
RESPONDER(TPM, SP, nt, t, scos, app) knows SKey(TPM), DKey(TPM), VKey, EKey
#System
INITIATOR(SerPro, TruPlaMan, Nsp, S, APP, SCOS)
RESPONDER(TruPlaMan, SerPro, Ntpm, T, SCOS, APP)
#Functions
symbolic VKey, SKey, EKey, DKey
#Intruder Information
Intruder = MAppl
IntruderKnowledge = {SerPro, TruPlaMan, MAppl, MAppl, Nm, DKey(MAppl), SKey(MAppl),
VKey, EKey, M}
#Specification
StrongSecret(SP, sessionKey, [TPM])
Aliveness(SP, TPM)
Aliveness(TPM, SP)
Agreement(SP, TPM, [sessionKey])
Agreement(TPM, SP, [sessionKey])
#Equivalences
forall x, y : Num . Exp(Exp(Gen, x), y) = Exp(Exp (Gen, y), x)
B.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol Smart Card
The Casper script in this section corresponds to the Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol
Smart Card (STCP SC ) described in section6.4.
#Free variables
datatype Field = Gen | Exp(Field, Num) unwinding 2
halfkeySP, halfkeyTPM, sessionKey : Field
SP, TPM : Agent
ns, nt, nm, scos, app : Nonce
s, t : Num
VKey: Agent -> PublicKey
SKey: Agent -> SecretKey
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