A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

6.2 Secure Channel Protocols
smart card environment.
In section 6.6, we compare the proposed STCP with the existing protocols. These protocols
include the Station-to-Station (STS) protocol [174], the Aziz-Die (AD) protocol [175],
the ASPeCT protocol [176, 177], Just-Fast-Keying (JFK) [178], trusted TLS (T2LS) [165],
SCP81 [169], Markantonakis-Mayes (MM) protocol [83], and the Sirett-Mayes (SM) protocol
[173].
For brevity and clarity, details of these protocols are provided in appendix A except for
the GlobalPlatform SCP10. A point to note is that GlobalPlatform SCP10 provides the
guidelines on how to implement a public key-based SCP for smart cards and not the
actual protocol. The guidelines stipulated by the GlobalPlatform SCP10 are the core
design requirement of the MM protocol and for this reason we have chosen this protocol.
The selection of the listed protocols is intentionally kept broad to include well-established
protocols like STS, Aziz-Die (AD) and JFK. Also included is the ASPeCT protocol,
which is designed specically for the mobile network's value-added services. The T2LS
is based on the concept of trusted channels, whereas SCP81, SM, and MM protocols are
specic to smart cards. As a common criterion, we have only selected protocols whose
design is rooted in asymmetric crypto-systems.
6.2.3 Minimum Security and Operational Goals
For a protocol to support the UCTD framework, it should meet at minimum the security
and operational requirements listed below:
SOG-1. Mutual Entity Authentication: A smart card and an SP authenticate to each other
to avoid masquerading by a malicious entity.
SOG-2. Exchange of certied public keys between the entities to facilitate the key generation
and entity authentication process.
SOG-3. Mutual Key Agreement: Communicating parties will agree on the generation of a
key during the protocol run.
SOG-4. Joint Key Control: Communicating parties will mutually control the generation
of new keys to avoid one party choosing weak keys or predetermining any portion
of the session key.
SOG-5. Key Freshness: The generated key will be fresh to the protocol session to protect
replay attacks.
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