A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

B.6 Application Binding Protocol Local
AppI: ApplicationIdentity
CARDID, SeudoAPPi: SeudoIdentities
SmartCOS: SmartCardOS
APP: SPApplication
TEKEY, TAKEY : SessionKey
InverseKeys = (TEKEY,TEKEY), (TAKEY,TAKEY)
#Processes
INITIATOR(SP, SPi, SC, User, gSP, nSP, App, Appi)knows SKey(SP), VKey
RESPONDER(SC, SCi, SP, User, Useri, TSM, TSMi, SeudoAppi, CardID, SCOS, gSC, nSC,\
TEKey, TAKey) knows SKey(User), SKey(SC), VKey
SERVER(TSM,TSMi, SC, SCi, User, CardID, nTSM, TEKey, TAKey)knows SKey(TSM), VKey
#System
INITIATOR(SProvider, ISProvider, SCard, USER, GSP, NSP, APP, AppI)
RESPONDER(SCard, ISCard, SProvider, USER, IUSER, TrustedSM, ITrustedSM, SeudoAPPi,
CARDID, SmartCOS, GSC, NSC, TEKEY, TAKEY)
SERVER(TrustedSM,ITrustedSM, SCard, ISCard, USER, CARDID, NTSM, TEKEY, TAKEY)
#Functions
symbolic VKey, SKey
#Intruder Information
Intruder = MaliciousEntity
IntruderKnowledge = {SProvider, SCard, MaliciousEntity, IMaliciousEntity, \
GMalicious, NMalicious, SKey(MaliciousEntity), VKey}
#Specification
Aliveness(SP, SC)
Aliveness(SC, SP)
Aliveness(SC, TSM)
Aliveness(TSM, SC)
Agreement(SP, SC, [DHKey, EnKey, MaKey])
StrongSecret(SP, Appi, [SC])
StrongSecret(SC, Appi, [SP])
StrongSecret(SP, Useri, [SC])
StrongSecret(SC, Useri, [SP])
#Equivalences
forall x, y : Num . Exp(Exp(Gen, x), y) = Exp(Exp(Gen, y), x)
B.6 Application Binding Protocol Local
The Casper script in this section corresponds to the Application Binding Protocol Local
(ABPL) described in section 7.4.
#Free variables
S, C, spS, spC : Agent
TPM : Server
nc, ns, nm : Nonce
ksc, abKsc : SessionKey
f : HashFunction
ServerKey : Agent -> ServerKeys
VKey : Agent -> Publickey
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