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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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1.3 Motivation and Challenges<br />

computing device the consumer is using. The user and the bank get security and privacy<br />

protection from the UCTD regardless of the device (e.g. computer, mobile phone, tablet,<br />

and POS, etc.) from wherever they are connecting to the payment network. There<strong>for</strong>e,<br />

feature-rich computing devices can have applications that rely on the services provided by<br />

the UCTD to enable a security- and privacy-preserving framework.<br />

For such a device, we consider that smart cards oer the most promising architecture.<br />

In our opinion, the rigorous design and analysis constituted in the smart card industry<br />

can benet other computing environments by providing security, privacy, and reliability<br />

services. If we port the smart card architecture as a generic tamper-resistant device that<br />

can interface with dierent computing environments then it can provide a ubiquitous,<br />

interoperable, exible, dynamic, secure, and reliable architecture that can store and execute<br />

security- and privacy-sensitive applications. In this thesis, we use the term smart card as<br />

inclusive of the technology (both hardware and software architecture) and without any<br />

restriction on <strong>for</strong>m factors. The smart card architecture can only be realised as a UCTD<br />

if the associated ownership issues are resolved.<br />

The most prominent ownership model in the smart card industry is centred on the organisation,<br />

which acquires smart cards from card manufacturers and issues them to the<br />

customers. Such organisations are referred to as card issuers and in this thesis this ownership<br />

model is called the Issuer <strong>Centric</strong> Smart Card Ownership <strong>Model</strong> (ICOM). This model<br />

provided much needed momentum in the smart card industry, driving the technological and<br />

infrastructural improvements to provide better, more secure and reliable services to customers.<br />

It also enabled the initial motivation <strong>for</strong> standardising the smart card technology<br />

(e.g. ISO 7816 [24], ISO 14443 [25]) and its applications <strong>for</strong> specic elds (e.g. GSM [26],<br />

EMV [9] and ITSO [27], etc.).<br />

The ICOM architecture is restrictive and might not be suitable <strong>for</strong> smart cards if they are<br />

to be adapted as UCTDs. There<strong>for</strong>e, we propose a model that provides a more exible,<br />

and dynamic plat<strong>for</strong>m which also gives control of the smart card to its users. This model is<br />

referred to as the <strong>User</strong> <strong>Centric</strong> Smart Card Ownership <strong>Model</strong> (UCOM). The term ownership<br />

(control) in the proposed model means freedom of choice that gives a UCTD owner the<br />

privilege of installing or deleting any application as they desire. However, this does not<br />

mean that they have the ownership of individual applications installed on the device [10].<br />

The application(s) installed on the smart card will always be under the total control of<br />

the application issuers (i.e. the SPs) and the user will be entitled to use these applications<br />

under sanction from their respective SPs. Furthermore, the choice about whether to lease<br />

an application to a card (user) resides solely with the relevant SP. There<strong>for</strong>e, we can dene<br />

a UCTD as a device whose architecture is based on the smart card technology that supports<br />

the UCOM framework.<br />

25

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