A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

7.5 Platform Binding Protocol
Following message four (ABPL-4); the SE veries the hash value of the CL to be the same
as the value listed either by the SE's SP or by a CC evaluation authority. It then generates
an application-binding key and encrypts it with the session key. In addition, the message
contains the object reference to the SE's shared resources and access permissions. The
CL directly calls the SE's shared resource in all subsequent requests, using the binding
key for authentication and authorisation.
ABPL-6. CL → SE : CL i ||SE i ||e KSE−CL (AP ||(N CL |N SE ) + 1)
This message gives the assurance to the SE that the CL also has the same key, thus
achieving mutual key conrmation (SOG-6: section 6.2.3).
7.5 Platform Binding Protocol
The Platform Binding Protocol (PBP) is executed between two smart cards that are listed
as SCA and SCB. Both smart cards can be part of the same CAMS or they may be
associated with two dierent CAMS and this is accommodated by the protocol described
in section 7.5.2.
7.5.1 Protocol Prerequisite
The protocol prerequisite for the PBP is fundamentally dierent from the ones discussed
before, as most of them focused on the smart card applications whereas the PBP is focused
on the smart card itself. The prerequisite for the PBP is listed below:
PPR-17 Syndicated Members: Both smart cards are registered with a CDAM network,
either directly to the same CAMS or two dierent CAMS on separate devices (e.g.
mobile phones, personal computers).
7.5.2 Protocol Description
The protocol can be initiated by any smart card; however, in this section we take SCA as
the initiator of the PBP.
PBP-1. SCA : SCA cm = h(N SCA ||g r SCA||SCB ′ i )
SCA → SCB : SCA ′ i ||SCB′ i ||N SCA||SCA cm ||SCA Sup
176