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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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4.6 Device Ownership<br />

4.5.3 Challenge-Response Pair Generation<br />

In the case of the mechanism based exclusively on the PRNG as depicted in algorithm 4.4,<br />

the card manufacturer will provide a set of seed values that is referred as the seed le. The<br />

seed le has a limited set of seeds and with the PRNG designed to update, the seed le<br />

will keep the internal state of the PRNG dicult to emulate by an adversary.<br />

On the other hand, if the online attestation mechanism is based on PUFs then the card<br />

manufacturer requests the smart card to generate a limited set of CRPs. A new CRP is<br />

generated on every successful online attestation; there<strong>for</strong>e, the card manufacturer does not<br />

need to maintain an exhaustive set of CRPs <strong>for</strong> individual smart cards.<br />

4.6 Device Ownership<br />

An o-card entity can have one of two types of ownerships on a UCTD. These are discussed<br />

in subsequent sections.<br />

4.6.1 Administrative Ownership<br />

This ownership privilege is enabled in the UCTD to accommodate the requirements of an<br />

IT infrastructure in a corporate, government or public institution (i.e. schools, library, etc.)<br />

to manage hand-held and traditional computing plat<strong>for</strong>ms. In addition, the administrative<br />

ownership enables the scheme in which an organisation that is referred as administrative<br />

authority (i.e. MNOs, CIBs, TSOs, SCMs, and MPMs, etc.) can issue smart cards to its<br />

customers and may charge either the application provider or the user on each application<br />

download (section 3.6).<br />

An entity with administrative privileges can install an application in the administrator<br />

space on a UCTD. The administrator space is an application space (section 4.2.1) on a<br />

UCTD that is under the control of the administrative authority. The user of the UCTD<br />

will not have any privilege to install or delete an application from the administrator space;<br />

the user only has the right to use these applications to acquire sanctioned services. The<br />

administrator space can enable the administrative authority to install certain protection<br />

applications (i.e. applications related to network/system user policy, rewall and antivirus<br />

denitions, and content lters, etc.). Furthermore, administrative ownership does not give<br />

the administrative authority the privilege to install, delete or use/access any application<br />

that is installed by a user in her application space.<br />

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