A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism C.1.2 Oine PUF Algorithm The Java Card implementation that emulates the oine PUF algorithm discussed in section 4.5.1. 1 package s e l f t e s t O f f l i n e P U F ; 2 3 import javacard . framework .APDU; 4 import javacard . framework . Applet ; 5 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ; 6 import javacard . framework . ISOException ; 7 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ; 8 import javacard . framework . U t i l ; 9 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . AESKey ; 10 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . Key ; 11 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyBuilder ; 12 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . KeyPair ; 13 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ; 14 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPrivateKey ; 15 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RSAPublicKey ; 16 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . RandomData ; 17 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . S i g n a t u r e ; 18 import javacardx . apdu . ExtendedLength ; 19 import javacardx . crypto . Cipher ; 20 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ; 21 22 public class S e l f t e s t O f f l i n e extends Applet implements ExtendedLength { 23 private s t a t i c byte [ ] MemoryContents = { 24 ( byte ) 0x37 , ( byte ) 0x7a , ( byte ) 0xbc , ( byte ) 0xc0 , ( byte ) 0xea , ( byte ) 25 0x07 , ( byte ) 0x94 , ( byte ) 0x59 , ( byte ) 0xd6 , ( byte ) 0x37 , ( byte ) 0x6b , 26 ( byte ) 0x4c , ( byte ) 0x82 , ( byte ) 0xdb , ( byte ) 0x54 , ( byte ) 0xb2 , 27 ( byte ) 0xe8 , ( byte ) 0xea , ( byte ) 0x71 , ( byte ) 0xe1 , ( byte ) 0xa4 , 28 ( byte ) 0x41 , ( byte ) 0x06 , ( byte ) 0x44 , ( byte ) 0 xfe , ( byte ) 0x86 , 29 ( byte ) 0x8e , ( byte ) 0 x4f , ( byte ) 0x39 , ( byte ) 0 xf5 , ( byte ) 0xdb , 30 ( byte ) 0xd1 , ( byte ) 0 xf1 , ( byte ) 0xc5 , ( byte ) 0xd8 , ( byte ) 0xac , 31 ( byte ) 0xbb , ( byte ) 0x73 , ( byte ) 0x51 , ( byte ) 0xa1 , ( byte ) 0xa3 , 32 ( byte ) 0x8a , ( byte ) 0x26 , ( byte ) 0x5d , ( byte ) 0 xf3 , ( byte ) 0x61 , 33 ( byte ) 0x55 , ( byte ) 0x56 , ( byte ) 0x39 , ( byte ) 0 x3f , ( byte ) 0x4c , 34 ( byte ) 0x2a , ( byte ) 0x43 , ( byte ) 0xc4 , ( byte ) 0xd7 , ( byte ) 0xa1 , 35 ( byte ) 0xaa , ( byte ) 0xc1 , ( byte ) 0 xf2 , ( byte ) 0xd6 , ( byte ) 0x07 , 36 ( byte ) 0xa8 , ( byte ) 0x58 , ( byte ) 0x9a , ( byte ) 0x70 , ( byte ) 0x84 , 37 ( byte ) 0x15 , ( byte ) 0x19 , ( byte ) 0x56 , ( byte ) 0x61 , ( byte ) 0x3d , 38 ( byte ) 0x88 , ( byte ) 0x2a , ( byte ) 0x44 , ( byte ) 0x54 , ( byte ) 0x29 , 39 ( byte ) 0x29 , ( byte ) 0x26 , ( byte ) 0x36 , ( byte ) 0x06 , ( byte ) 0 xfe , 40 ( byte ) 0xad , ( byte ) 0x27 , ( byte ) 0x13 , ( byte ) 0x86 , ( byte ) 0x0e , 41 ( byte ) 0x85 , ( byte ) 0x3c , ( byte ) 0x32 , ( byte ) 0xe2 , ( byte ) 0x38 , 42 ( byte ) 0xd2 , ( byte ) 0x91 , ( byte ) 0x82 , ( byte ) 0x89 , ( byte ) 0 xce , 43 ( byte ) 0x79 , ( byte ) 0x02 , ( byte ) 0x43 , ( byte ) 0 xfd , ( byte ) 0 xaf , 44 ( byte ) 0x18 , ( byte ) 0xe8 , ( byte ) 0x5b , ( byte ) 0xd4 , ( byte ) 0x72 , 45 ( byte ) 0x03 , ( byte ) 0x63 , ( byte ) 0x2b , ( byte ) 0x29 , ( byte ) 0x72 , 46 ( byte ) 0xe0 , ( byte ) 0x92 , ( byte ) 0x54 , ( byte ) 0x06 , ( byte ) 0x1c , 258
C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 47 ( byte ) 0 x7f , ( byte ) 0xc7 , ( byte ) 0x37 , ( byte ) 0x93 , ( byte ) 0 x2f , 48 ( byte ) 0x7a , ( byte ) 0x84 , ( byte ) 0x95 , ( byte ) 0 xec , ( byte ) 0x5e , 49 ( byte ) 0xa5 , ( byte ) 0 xf6 , ( byte ) 0x4e , ( byte ) 0x7e , ( byte ) 0 x1f , 50 ( byte ) 0xe6 , ( byte ) 0xe2 , ( byte ) 0x04 , ( byte ) 0x2e , ( byte ) 0x25 , 51 ( byte ) 0 x7f , ( byte ) 0 x2f , ( byte ) 0x3c , ( byte ) 0 xfe , ( byte ) 0x57 , 52 ( byte ) 0x9e , ( byte ) 0 x7f , ( byte ) 0 xce , ( byte ) 0x72 , ( byte ) 0xc0 , 53 ( byte ) 0xe9 , ( byte ) 0x79 , ( byte ) 0x05 , ( byte ) 0xc5 , ( byte ) 0 xfd , 54 ( byte ) 0x6a , ( byte ) 0x46 , ( byte ) 0 xfe , ( byte ) 0x33 , ( byte ) 0x84 , 55 ( byte ) 0 x3f , ( byte ) 0x09 , ( byte ) 0xae , ( byte ) 0x01 , ( byte ) 0x18 , 56 ( byte ) 0x5a , ( byte ) 0 xf6 , ( byte ) 0xc6 , ( byte ) 0xd3 , ( byte ) 0xa1 , 57 ( byte ) 0xe2 , ( byte ) 0x90 , ( byte ) 0x83 , ( byte ) 0x79 , ( byte ) 0 xee , 58 ( byte ) 0xa6 , ( byte ) 0xd4 , ( byte ) 0 xf6 , ( byte ) 0xd1 , ( byte ) 0x86 , 59 ( byte ) 0x91 , ( byte ) 0x34 , ( byte ) 0x00 , ( byte ) 0xd3 , ( byte ) 0xe4 , 60 ( byte ) 0x8a , ( byte ) 0 xfb , ( byte ) 0xaa , ( byte ) 0x6c , ( byte ) 0xe5 , 61 ( byte ) 0x46 , ( byte ) 0xa7 , ( byte ) 0x00 , ( byte ) 0x9e , ( byte ) 0xd8 , 62 ( byte ) 0x81 , ( byte ) 0xbc , ( byte ) 0xd1 , ( byte ) 0xb5 , ( byte ) 0x60 , 63 ( byte ) 0xd5 , ( byte ) 0x91 , ( byte ) 0x13 , ( byte ) 0x06 , ( byte ) 0x68 , 64 ( byte ) 0x21 , ( byte ) 0 x8f , ( byte ) 0x7d , ( byte ) 0xc2 , ( byte ) 0x3e , 65 ( byte ) 0xd2 , ( byte ) 0x75 , ( byte ) 0 x0f , ( byte ) 0x97 , ( byte ) 0x64 , 66 ( byte ) 0xb1 , ( byte ) 0xdb , ( byte ) 0x74 , ( byte ) 0x6e , ( byte ) 0x91 , 67 ( byte ) 0x6b , ( byte ) 0xa7 , ( byte ) 0x7d , ( byte ) 0 xef , ( byte ) 0x8b , 68 ( byte ) 0x37 , ( byte ) 0xb7 , ( byte ) 0x84 , ( byte ) 0x1e , ( byte ) 0xa7 , 69 ( byte ) 0x26 , ( byte ) 0x26 , ( byte ) 0xea , ( byte ) 0xe9 , ( byte ) 0xb7 , 70 ( byte ) 0x5e , ( byte ) 0 x3f , ( byte ) 0 xdf , ( byte ) 0xa4 , ( byte ) 0xc5 , 71 ( byte ) 0x45 , ( byte ) 0x4e , ( byte ) 0x34 , ( byte ) 0x33 , ( byte ) 0xe5 , 72 ( byte ) 0x43 , ( byte ) 0x46 , ( byte ) 0xc0 , ( byte ) 0x2b , ( byte ) 0xbd , 73 ( byte ) 0x85 , ( byte ) 0 x2f , ( byte ) 0xca , ( byte ) 0 xf8 , ( byte ) 0x9d , 74 ( byte ) 0xb4 , ( byte ) 0xbc , ( byte ) 0x67 , ( byte ) 0x92 , ( byte ) 0xd4 , 75 ( byte ) 0x33 , ( byte ) 0 xfd , ( byte ) 0xbd , ( byte ) 0x82 , ( byte ) 0x9d , 76 ( byte ) 0x62 , ( byte ) 0 xfc , ( byte ) 0xbb , ( byte ) 0xd2 , ( byte ) 0xad , 77 ( byte ) 0x05 , ( byte ) 0xa2 , ( byte ) 0 xfc , ( byte ) 0x2d , ( byte ) 0xe3 , 78 ( byte ) 0x02 , ( byte ) 0xe2 , ( byte ) 0x41 , ( byte ) 0x9b , ( byte ) 0 x1f , 79 ( byte ) 0 xf8 , ( byte ) 0x87 , ( byte ) 0x15 , ( byte ) 0x89 , ( byte ) 0 xfb , 80 ( byte ) 0x53 , ( byte ) 0x99 , ( byte ) 0xb3 , ( byte ) 0xeb , ( byte ) 0xdb , 81 ( byte ) 0x01 , ( byte ) 0 xaf , ( byte ) 0x71 , ( byte ) 0xd2 , ( byte ) 0 xf2 , 82 ( byte ) 0x73 , ( byte ) 0xb7 , ( byte ) 0x82 , ( byte ) 0x30 , ( byte ) 0x25 , 83 ( byte ) 0x04 , ( byte ) 0x29 , ( byte ) 0x2b , ( byte ) 0xb9 , ( byte ) 0x92 , 84 ( byte ) 0x92 , ( byte ) 0x35 , ( byte ) 0x97 , ( byte ) 0x0e , ( byte ) 0xb8 , 85 ( byte ) 0 xf2 , ( byte ) 0xc6 , ( byte ) 0x2e , ( byte ) 0xa7 , ( byte ) 0x2d , 86 ( byte ) 0x0c , ( byte ) 0x09 , ( byte ) 0x5e , ( byte ) 0x07 , ( byte ) 0x06 , 87 ( byte ) 0x67 , ( byte ) 0xa0 , ( byte ) 0 xdf , ( byte ) 0x55 , ( byte ) 0x09 , 88 ( byte ) 0 xfc , ( byte ) 0 xee , ( byte ) 0x2b , ( byte ) 0x13 , ( byte ) 0x1a , 89 ( byte ) 0x2e , ( byte ) 0x5d , ( byte ) 0x0a , ( byte ) 0xbb , ( byte ) 0x45 , 90 ( byte ) 0x75 , ( byte ) 0 xf4 , ( byte ) 0xd8 , ( byte ) 0xdc , ( byte ) 0x2e , 91 ( byte ) 0x99 , ( byte ) 0x2a , ( byte ) 0x13 , ( byte ) 0xa1 , ( byte ) 0x1e , 92 ( byte ) 0x99 , ( byte ) 0 xfd , ( byte ) 0xdc , ( byte ) 0 xcf , ( byte ) 0 xcc , 93 ( byte ) 0 x3f , ( byte ) 0x42 , ( byte ) 0 xf7 , ( byte ) 0x3d , ( byte ) 0x73 , 94 ( byte ) 0 xee , ( byte ) 0xca , ( byte ) 0x76 , ( byte ) 0xe4 , ( byte ) 0x75 , 95 ( byte ) 0xc4 , ( byte ) 0x21 , ( byte ) 0xd4 , ( byte ) 0x14 , ( byte ) 0x2e , 96 ( byte ) 0x22 , ( byte ) 0x9c , ( byte ) 0 xce , ( byte ) 0x10 , ( byte ) 0 xaf , 97 ( byte ) 0xa6 , ( byte ) 0x25 , ( byte ) 0xa0 , ( byte ) 0x01 , ( byte ) 0xb1 , 259
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A User Centric Security Model for T
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Declaration These doctoral studies
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R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, and
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Abstract In this thesis we propose
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CONTENTS 3.4.1 Supplier . . . . . .
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CONTENTS 7 Application Sharing Mech
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CONTENTS C.4 Secure and Trusted Cha
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LIST OF FIGURES 8.6 Control ow diag
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List of Abbreviations AAC Applicati
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1.1 Setting the Scene 1.1 Setting t
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1.2 A Brief History of Smart Cards
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1.3 Motivation and Challenges Over
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1.3 Motivation and Challenges compu
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1.4 Contributions the UCTD manufact
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis traditi
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Chapter 2 User Centric Tamper-Resis
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2.2 Rationale for a User Centric Ta
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2.2 Rationale for a User Centric Ta
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2.3 Candidates for User Centric Tam
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Businesses Governments Privacy Pres
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2.4 The User Centric Tamper-Resista
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2.5 Case Studies an enrolment proce
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2.5 Case Studies issued the applica
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Chapter 3 Smart Card Ownership Mode
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3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Owner
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3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Owner
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM which i
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM Applica
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM which i
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM Element
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3.4 User Centric Smart Card Ownersh
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3.5 Security and Operational Requir
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Service Provider 3.6 Coopetitive Ar
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Chapter 4 User Centric Smart Card A
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4.2 Platform Architecture Platform
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4.2 Platform Architecture manager c
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4.3 Trusted Environment & Execution
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4.4 Security Assurance and Validati
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms 4.5 Atte
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms rational
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms otherwis
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4.6 Device Ownership 4.6.2 User Own
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4.7 Attestation Protocol can succes
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4.7 Attestation Protocol an adversa
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4.7 Attestation Protocol SC i ′ a
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4.8 Protocol Analysis CasperFDR app
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4.9 Summary whereas the online atte
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5.1 Introduction 5.1 Introduction E
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5.2 GlobalPlatform Card Management
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5.3 Multos Card Management Framewor
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5.4 Proposed Smart Card Management
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5.4 Proposed Smart Card Management
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5.5 Card Management-Related Issues
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Chapter 6 Secure and Trusted Channe
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols 6.2 Se
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols smart
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols SOG-16
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols Notati
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6.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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6.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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6.5 Application Acquisition and Con
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6.6 Analysis of the Proposed Protoc
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6.7 Summary For the STCP ACA , we n
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Chapter 7 Application Sharing Mecha
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism 7
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism I
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism a
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7.3 UCTD Firewall utilises CDAM to
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7.3 UCTD Firewall application. Ther
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7.3 UCTD Firewall 7.3.6 Cross-Devic
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7.3 UCTD Firewall and asynchronous
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7.3 UCTD Firewall Table 7.2: Protoc
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7.4 Application Binding Protocol L
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7.5 Platform Binding Protocol The r
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7.6 Application Binding Protocol D
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Chapter 8 Smart Card Runtime Enviro
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8.2 Smart Card Runtime Environment
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism In
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism it
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism er
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism id
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism Th
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8.4 Analysis of the Runtime Protect
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Page 231 and 232: Appendix A Description of Protocols
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Page 241 and 242: B.1 Brief Introduction to the Caspe
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Page 249 and 250: B.7 Platform Binding Protocol B.7 P
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C.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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C.6 Application Acquisition and Con
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C.7 Application Binding Protocol -
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 17 im
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 119 p
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 221 i
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 323 c
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 424 +
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 524 S
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 47 (
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 149 J
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 350 +
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 451 p
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 552 r
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C.10 Abstract Virtual Machine 42 "
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C.11 Implementation Helper Classes
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BIBLIOGRAPHY August 2009, pp. 2035.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Available: http://www.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Institute of Technolog
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BIBLIOGRAPHY ing, vol. 2, pp. 42342
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Available: http://csrc
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Group_TRUST/PubsPDF/CA
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [161] D. A. Basin, S.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY pp. 1414. [186] R. N.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [208] T. S. Messerges,
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Science, P. Samarati,
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