A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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C.6 Application Acquisition and Contractual Agreement Protocol 280 this . mySessionEncryptionKey ) ; 281 this . childExtractionFromCTLV ( EncryptedData ) ; 282 i f ( Arrays . e q u a l s ( PlatformHashPreset , 283 this . PlatformHash . getValueBytes ( ) ) ) {} 284 else { 285 System . out . p r i n t l n ( " Platform Digest Not V e r i f i e d " ) ; 286 } 287 childExtractionFromCTLV ( this . S C C e r t i f i c a t e ) ; 288 B i g I n t e g e r SCpublicExponent = new B i g I n t e g e r ( byteToString 289 ( this . PublicExponent . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ; 290 B i g I n t e g e r SCpublicModulus = new B i g I n t e g e r ( byteToString 291 ( this . PublicModulus . getValueBytes ( ) ) , 16) ; 292 KeyFactory f a c t o r y = KeyFactory . g e t I n s t a n c e ( "RSA" ) ; 293 SCVerificationKey = ( PublicKey ) f a c t o r y . g e n e r a t e P u b l i c (new 294 RSAPublicKeySpec ( SCpublicModulus , 295 SCpublicExponent ) ) ; 296 temp = new byte [ ( this . PlatformHash . getTagLength ( ) + 297 this . U s e r I d e n t i t y . getTagLength ( ) + 298 this . SCIdentity . getTagLength ( ) + 299 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) + 300 this . SPRandomNumber . getTagLength ( ) ) ] ; 301 System . arraycopy ( this . EncryptedData . getBytesTlvRepresentation ( ) , 7 , 302 temp , 0 , temp . l e n g t h ) ; 303 i f ( this . myProtocolHelperObject . SignatureMethod ( temp , 0 , 304 temp . length , this . SignedData . getValueBytes ( ) , 0 , 305 SCVerificationKey , P r o t o c o l H e l p e r C l a s s .SIGN_MODE_VERIFICATION) ) 306 {} 307 else { 308 System . out . p r i n t l n ( 309 " S i g n a t u r e V e r i f i c a t i o n F a i l e d . . . . . . Check code " ) ; 310 } 311 } 312 } catch ( Exception cE ) { 313 System . out . p r i n t l n ( " Error i n ProtocolHandler . inMessageProcessing : " 314 + cE . g e t C l a s s ( ) . getName ( ) ) ; 315 } 316 return true ; 317 } 318 public s t a t i c S t r i n g byteToString ( byte [ ] inArray ) { 319 byte [ ] HEX_CHAR_TABLE = { 320 ( byte ) ' 0 ' , ( byte ) ' 1 ' , ( byte ) ' 2 ' , ( byte ) ' 3 ' , ( byte ) ' 4 ' , ( byte ) ' 5 ' , 321 ( byte ) ' 6 ' , ( byte ) ' 7 ' , ( byte ) ' 8 ' , ( byte ) ' 9 ' , ( byte ) ' a ' , ( byte ) ' b ' , 322 ( byte ) ' c ' , ( byte ) ' d ' , ( byte ) ' e ' , ( byte ) ' f ' 323 } ; 324 byte [ ] hex = new byte [ 2 ∗ inArray . l e n g t h ] ; 325 int index = 0 ; 326 for ( byte b : inArray ) { 327 int v = b & 0xFF ; 356
C.6 Application Acquisition and Contractual Agreement Protocol 328 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v >>> 4 ] ; 329 hex [ index++] = HEX_CHAR_TABLE[ v & 0xF ] ; 330 } 331 try { 332 return new S t r i n g ( hex , "ASCII" ) ; 333 } catch ( Exception cE ) { 334 System . out . p r i n t l n ( " Exception in bytesToString : " + cE . getMessage ( ) ) 335 ; 336 } 337 return " Error " ; 338 } 339 void childExtractionFromCTLV ( ConstructedTLV inCTLV) { 340 try { 341 int c h i l d s = inCTLV . getChildNumbers ( ) ; 342 PrimitiveTLV pTemp = null ; 343 ConstructedTLV cTemp = null ; 344 while ( c h i l d s > 0) { 345 switch (inCTLV . nextType ( ) ) { 346 case 1 : 347 pTemp = ( PrimitiveTLV )inCTLV . getNext ( ) ; 348 i f ( Arrays . e q u a l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) , 349 this . SCDHChallenge . getTagName ( ) ) ) { 350 this . SCDHChallenge = pTemp ; 351 } else i f ( Arrays . e q u a l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) , 352 this . SCRandomNumber . getTagName ( ) ) ) { 353 this . SCRandomNumber = pTemp ; 354 } else i f ( Arrays . e q u a l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) , 355 this . MACedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) { 356 this . MACedData = pTemp ; 357 } else i f ( Arrays . e q u a l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) , 358 this . SPCookie . getTagName ( ) ) ) { 359 i f ( Arrays . e q u a l s (pTemp . getBytesTlvRepresentation ( ) , 360 this . SPCookie . getBytesTlvRepresentation ( ) ) ) {} 361 } else i f ( Arrays . e q u a l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) , 362 this . SCIdentity . getTagName ( ) ) ) { 363 this . SCIdentity = pTemp ; 364 } else i f ( Arrays . e q u a l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) , 365 this . SignedData . getTagName ( ) ) ) { 366 this . SignedData = pTemp ; 367 } else i f ( Arrays . e q u a l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) , 368 this . PublicExponent . getTagName ( ) ) ) { 369 this . PublicExponent = pTemp ; 370 } else i f ( Arrays . e q u a l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) , 371 this . PublicModulus . getTagName ( ) ) ) { 372 this . PublicModulus = pTemp ; 373 } else i f ( Arrays . e q u a l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) , 374 this . PlatformHash . getTagName ( ) ) ) { 375 this . PlatformHash = pTemp ; 376 } else i f ( Arrays . e q u a l s (pTemp . getTagName ( ) , 377 this . U s e r I d e n t i t y . getTagName ( ) ) ) { 357
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A User Centric Security Model for T
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Declaration These doctoral studies
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R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, and
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Abstract In this thesis we propose
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CONTENTS 3.4.1 Supplier . . . . . .
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CONTENTS 7 Application Sharing Mech
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CONTENTS C.4 Secure and Trusted Cha
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LIST OF FIGURES 8.6 Control ow diag
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List of Abbreviations AAC Applicati
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1.1 Setting the Scene 1.1 Setting t
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1.2 A Brief History of Smart Cards
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1.3 Motivation and Challenges Over
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1.3 Motivation and Challenges compu
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1.4 Contributions the UCTD manufact
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis traditi
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Chapter 2 User Centric Tamper-Resis
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2.2 Rationale for a User Centric Ta
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2.2 Rationale for a User Centric Ta
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2.3 Candidates for User Centric Tam
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Businesses Governments Privacy Pres
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2.4 The User Centric Tamper-Resista
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2.5 Case Studies an enrolment proce
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2.5 Case Studies issued the applica
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Chapter 3 Smart Card Ownership Mode
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3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Owner
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3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Owner
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM which i
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM Applica
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM which i
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM Element
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3.4 User Centric Smart Card Ownersh
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3.5 Security and Operational Requir
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Service Provider 3.6 Coopetitive Ar
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Chapter 4 User Centric Smart Card A
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4.2 Platform Architecture Platform
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4.2 Platform Architecture manager c
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4.3 Trusted Environment & Execution
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4.4 Security Assurance and Validati
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms 4.5 Atte
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms rational
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms otherwis
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4.6 Device Ownership 4.6.2 User Own
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4.7 Attestation Protocol can succes
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4.7 Attestation Protocol an adversa
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4.7 Attestation Protocol SC i ′ a
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4.8 Protocol Analysis CasperFDR app
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4.9 Summary whereas the online atte
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5.1 Introduction 5.1 Introduction E
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5.2 GlobalPlatform Card Management
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5.3 Multos Card Management Framewor
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5.4 Proposed Smart Card Management
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5.4 Proposed Smart Card Management
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5.5 Card Management-Related Issues
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Chapter 6 Secure and Trusted Channe
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols 6.2 Se
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols smart
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols SOG-16
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols Notati
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6.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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6.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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6.5 Application Acquisition and Con
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6.6 Analysis of the Proposed Protoc
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6.7 Summary For the STCP ACA , we n
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Chapter 7 Application Sharing Mecha
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism 7
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism I
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism a
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7.3 UCTD Firewall utilises CDAM to
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7.3 UCTD Firewall application. Ther
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7.3 UCTD Firewall 7.3.6 Cross-Devic
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7.3 UCTD Firewall and asynchronous
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7.3 UCTD Firewall Table 7.2: Protoc
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7.4 Application Binding Protocol L
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7.5 Platform Binding Protocol The r
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7.6 Application Binding Protocol D
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Chapter 8 Smart Card Runtime Enviro
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8.2 Smart Card Runtime Environment
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism In
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism it
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism er
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism id
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism Th
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8.4 Analysis of the Runtime Protect
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8.4 Analysis of the Runtime Protect
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8.5 Summary representation; the abs
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Chapter 9 Backup, Migration, and De
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9.2 Backup and Migration Framework
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9.2 Backup and Migration Framework
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9.3 Application Deletion tion of th
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9.3 Application Deletion The deleti
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9.3 Application Deletion authorises
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9.5 Summary 9.5 Summary In this cha
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10.1 Summary and Conclusions 10.1 S
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10.1 Summary and Conclusions giving
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10.2 Recommendations for Future Wor
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Appendix A Description of Protocols
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A.3 Aziz-Die (AD) Protocol on the p
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A.5 Just-Fast-Keying (JFK) Protocol
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A.8 Markantonakis-Mayes (MM) Protoc
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A.9 Sirett-Mayes-Markantonakis (SM)
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B.1 Brief Introduction to the Caspe
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B.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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B.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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B.6 Application Binding Protocol L
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B.7 Platform Binding Protocol B.7 P
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B.8 Application Binding Protocol D
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism C.1
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 93 (
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 194
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 47 (
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 148
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C.2 Online Attestation Mechanism C.
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C.2 Online Attestation Mechanism 10
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 15 import
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 112 f a l
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 214 } 215
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 312 inLeng
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 410 this .
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 7 import j
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 107 this .
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 204 ( this
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 302 } 303
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C.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 119 p
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 221 i
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 323 c
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 424 +
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 524 S
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 47 (
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 149 J
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 350 +
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 451 p
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 552 r
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C.10 Abstract Virtual Machine 42 "
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C.11 Implementation Helper Classes
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BIBLIOGRAPHY August 2009, pp. 2035.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Available: http://www.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Institute of Technolog
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BIBLIOGRAPHY ing, vol. 2, pp. 42342
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Available: http://csrc
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Group_TRUST/PubsPDF/CA
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [161] D. A. Basin, S.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY pp. 1414. [186] R. N.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [208] T. S. Messerges,
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Science, P. Samarati,
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