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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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3.2 Issuer <strong>Centric</strong> Smart Card Ownership <strong>Model</strong> (ICOM)<br />

3.2.1 Advantages of the ICOM<br />

Since the inception of smart card technology, issuers have adopted the ICOM as their<br />

model of preference <strong>for</strong> smart card based services. The advantages of this approach are<br />

presented below:<br />

Issuance Control. Only a legitimate issuer (organisation) can oer smart cards to its<br />

customers. The card issuer controls the availability of the cards and the card/application<br />

management lifecycle. The centralised control of applications and the card management<br />

lifecycle stand out as crucial elements in the acceptability of the ICOM. Centralised control<br />

has meant that the card issuer treats smart cards in a way similar to the way business<br />

assets are treated. There<strong>for</strong>e, issuers preferred smart cards to be under their control and the<br />

ICOM tted well with such commercial attitudes. In theory, by ensuring centralised control<br />

an issuer can increase the revenue streams by renting out space in a multi-application smart<br />

card. However, although such ideas are considered workable to some extent, the adoption<br />

of this model is not widespread.<br />

<strong>Security</strong> Control. A smart card is often deployed as a security token, which provides<br />

secure and reliable access to certain services. Most organisations prefer to retain control of<br />

the security mechanisms <strong>for</strong> access to their services, which are implemented on a smart card.<br />

This ensures that only the applications installed on their (issued) smart cards can access<br />

sanctioned services, which maintains the provided services. As the installed applications<br />

are designed by the card issuer, it is considered safe to connect with the services provided<br />

by the card issuer. Any compromise of the smart card's security will result in loss <strong>for</strong><br />

an organisation whose application is installed on the smart card, both nancially and in<br />

relation to the brand image. To remain secure and condent that the smart cards meet<br />

an organisation's security requirements, the organisation will prefer that the cards remains<br />

under its control as provided by the ICOM.<br />

Modication Control. Once a smart card is issued, only its issuer or trusted partners<br />

may modify the installed applications. There<strong>for</strong>e, a malicious user can neither install a new<br />

application nor modify existing applications. As the installation, modication or updating<br />

of an application is under control of either the card issuer or their trusted partners, it<br />

can be assumed with condence that no application on the smart cards will be malicious.<br />

This assumption that centralised control guarantees security led to a realistic but simple<br />

approach to numerous smart card security mechanisms; such as the smart card rewall<br />

[82], application installation mechanism/protocol [83], virtual machine [84] and plat<strong>for</strong>m<br />

assurance [56, 85, 86].<br />

55

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