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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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2.3 Candidates <strong>for</strong> <strong>User</strong> <strong>Centric</strong> <strong>Tamper</strong>-<strong>Resistant</strong> Device<br />

environment (e.g. TPM [18] and MTM [19]), b) only provide execution protection (e.g.<br />

AEGIS), c) have limited application execution without user control (i.e. TEE), d) have<br />

limited scalability regarding the support <strong>for</strong> dierent application and plat<strong>for</strong>m scenarios,<br />

e) do not provide dynamic trust validation and assurance [56] and require an implicit<br />

trust, f) do not require third party (security) evaluation, and g) do not provide user<br />

ownership/control (e.g. smart cards [32]). We discuss these technologies individually below<br />

and analyse their suitability <strong>for</strong> the UCTD architecture in table 2.1.<br />

2.3.1 Trusted Plat<strong>for</strong>m Module<br />

The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [36] started an initiative <strong>for</strong> providing a tamperresistant<br />

device referred as the Trusted Plat<strong>for</strong>m Module (TPM) [18]. The mission statement<br />

of the TCG commits it to providing authentication, data protection, network security,<br />

and disaster recovery services [36]. A Trusted Plat<strong>for</strong>m Module (TPM) will measure the<br />

integrity matrixes referred to as Plat<strong>for</strong>m Conguration Registers (PCRs) that are securely<br />

sealed with cryptographic keys. If the TPM nds any discrepancies in the future<br />

integrity-measurements then it will ag the problem. A TPM does not decide whether this<br />

discrepancy is authorised by the user or whether it is due to a malicious entity.<br />

A TPM is a tamper-resistant device with a low footprint that is utilised as a root of<br />

trust to support the trusted computing plat<strong>for</strong>m. The concept of trust as dened by the<br />

Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is the evaluation of plat<strong>for</strong>m results as expected by the<br />

requesting entity [36]. A TPM is not concerned with whether the evaluated state is secure<br />

or not as long as the evaluation result is trusted by the requesting hall. There<strong>for</strong>e, we can<br />

say that a TPM is specically designed (or restricted) to be a trusted component, which<br />

will be physically bound (soldered) to a plat<strong>for</strong>m. The fundamental function of a TPM is<br />

to provide secure, trusted, and tamper-resistant root of (trusted) measurements on which<br />

the integrity measurement of the rest of the plat<strong>for</strong>m is dependent. A TPM is typically<br />

under the control of the plat<strong>for</strong>m user, and it has a secure and reliable software/hardware<br />

plat<strong>for</strong>m. However, it is not a general-purpose execution environment in which an arbitrary<br />

code can be executed and neither is it portable, unless a smart card is used to behave like<br />

a TPM [57][59]. In this chapter, we treat TPM and MTM together even though there are<br />

subtle dierences between them.<br />

2.3.2 AEGIS<br />

AEGIS is a single-chip secure processor that is designed to build trusted systems and is<br />

secure against physical and software attacks [20]. There<strong>for</strong>e, we can consider AEGIS as<br />

a processor with a limited memory that stores processor identication in<strong>for</strong>mation along<br />

37

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