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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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7.3 UCTD Firewall<br />

Smart Card A<br />

Server<br />

Application<br />

Sharing<br />

Request<br />

Smart Card Runtime Environment<br />

Fake Client<br />

Application<br />

Message transfer<br />

by the malicious user<br />

Fake Server<br />

Application<br />

Sharing<br />

Request<br />

Smart Card Runtime Environment<br />

Smart Card B<br />

Client<br />

Application<br />

Figure 7.7: Application masquerading and relay attack scenario<br />

SOG-20 Application Masquerading. In this scenario, a malicious application can masquerade<br />

as a server or client application. For example, in Java Card when a client<br />

application sends a request <strong>for</strong> application sharing it generates the request that contains<br />

the server application's AID. Now if a malicious application is masquerading<br />

as a server application, it only has to in<strong>for</strong>m the rewall that it accepts the application<br />

sharing request without validating that it has the knowledge of the shared<br />

secret. Thus the client application thinks that it is accessing the shared resource<br />

of the server application, whereas in fact it is communicating with a malicious<br />

application. Now the fake server application can resend the application sharing<br />

request message to a genuine server application on another smart card and gain<br />

access to shared resources; this scenario is illustrated in gure 7.7.<br />

SOG-21 Dierent <strong>User</strong>'s Applications. Consider a scenario in which we have two users<br />

and two applications. One is a malicious user M u while the other is an authorised<br />

user A u . The two applications are App A (server application) and App B (client<br />

application) that have a client-server relationship. Both users are authorised to<br />

download application App A , however M u is not authorised to download application<br />

App B . Now at some point, the M u obtains the App B 's credentials <strong>for</strong> the A u and<br />

manages to download App B onto his or her smart card. The application sharing<br />

between the M u 's App A and the A u 's App B can be established. This can lead to<br />

some nancial benets <strong>for</strong> the M u to which he or she is not entitled.<br />

Request <strong>for</strong> App A<br />

Credentials (M u)<br />

SP of App A SP of App B<br />

App A<br />

Credentials (M u)<br />

M Request <strong>for</strong> App App B<br />

B<br />

u<br />

Credentials (A u) Credentials (A u)<br />

Server<br />

Application<br />

(App A-M u)<br />

Smart Card of M u<br />

Sharing<br />

Smart Card Runtime Environment<br />

Client<br />

Application<br />

(App B-A u)<br />

Figure 7.8: Application sharing among dierent user's applications<br />

172

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