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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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3.5 <strong>Security</strong> and Operational Requirements of the UCOM<br />

rised cardholder can execute any privileged commands. These privileged commands<br />

can change the state of the smart card (e.g. alter the application installation and<br />

deletion commands).<br />

GR2. <strong>Security</strong>: This requirement stipulates the need to provide protection against attacks<br />

that can violate the security requirements of each of the UCOM components.<br />

There<strong>for</strong>e, the UCOM should provide an adequate security mechanism to protect all<br />

the components and their communications.<br />

GR3. Privacy: The privacy requirement is essential in the UCOM, since smart cards<br />

are used as a secure token to access some personal in<strong>for</strong>mation or monetary services.<br />

There<strong>for</strong>e, the UCOM should provide privacy services to those components that<br />

require it.<br />

GR4. Interoperability: The UCOM should not prefer any particular plat<strong>for</strong>m, SCOS,<br />

or hardware conguration. The aim is to provide an unrestricted scalability to the<br />

overall UCOM model. A smart card would present the list of supported functionalities<br />

to the requesting SP and then it would be up to the SP's discretion whether it<br />

leased its application or not. From the point of view of the smart card, the SP and<br />

the UCOM architecture, there should be no preference. If a smart card supports an<br />

SP's requirements and supports the security and operational functionality required<br />

by the SP's ALP, then the SP would lease its application on request, unless there<br />

is some genuine reason not to do so. In the event of a valid reason, the SP should<br />

in<strong>for</strong>m the requesting cardholder of the main reason <strong>for</strong> not leasing the application.<br />

GR5. Ease of Maintenance: The framework should be simple to use and maintain <strong>for</strong><br />

SPs. In addition, it should not require any extensive modication to the existing<br />

infrastructure.<br />

GR6. Impartiality: The smart card supplier could be a smart card manufacturer, an<br />

SP, or a third party vendor. Regardless of the supplier, the smart card should not<br />

favour any particular application or set of applications. This would be possible if<br />

an SP supplies the smart cards, and then they might be tempted to give additional<br />

privileges to its own application. There<strong>for</strong>e, the UCOM should provide guarantees<br />

that all applications will have the equivalent privileges to suit their operations.<br />

The major components of the UCOM are cardholders, smart cards, and SPs. In subsequent<br />

sections, the operational and security requirements of these major components are<br />

discussed.<br />

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