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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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4.2 Plat<strong>for</strong>m Architecture<br />

Plat<strong>for</strong>m Space<br />

Application Space<br />

Card Services<br />

Manager<br />

Card <strong>Security</strong><br />

Manager<br />

Cardholder’s<br />

<strong>Security</strong><br />

Manager<br />

Application Installation<br />

& Deletion Manager<br />

Subscription<br />

Manager<br />

Cross-Device<br />

Manager<br />

Backup &<br />

Restoration Manager<br />

Smart Card<br />

Firewall<br />

Domain<br />

of SP A<br />

Domain<br />

of SP B<br />

Domain<br />

of SP B<br />

Smart Card Firewall<br />

Smart Card Runtime Environment (SCRT)<br />

System Classes<br />

Application Programming Interfaces (APIs)<br />

Smart Card Virtual Machine<br />

Trusted Environment & Execution Manager (TEM)<br />

Native Code<br />

Smart Card Hardware<br />

Figure 4.1: <strong>User</strong> <strong>Centric</strong> Smart Card (UCSC) architecture<br />

Most of the components shown in gure 4.1 are either an improvement to the existing<br />

framework or an addition to the GlobalPlat<strong>for</strong>m architecture. We use GlobalPlat<strong>for</strong>m as<br />

the base architecture <strong>for</strong> the components in this section. These components modify the<br />

GlobalPlat<strong>for</strong>m card specication to accommodate the UCOM philosophy. Please note that<br />

in this section, we make repeated references to the security and operational requirements<br />

discussed in section 3.5.<br />

Furthermore, certain components that are shown as part of the UCTD architecture in<br />

gure 4.1 are discussed in later chapters where they are described in detail. These components<br />

include the application installation & deletion manager (chapters 5 and 9), the<br />

backup & restoration mechanism (chapter 9), the cross-device manager and smart card<br />

rewall (chapter 7), and the Smart Card Runtime Environment (chapter 8). We delay<br />

their discussion to later chapters <strong>for</strong> the sake of argument ow and logical placement as<br />

we compare them with the existing smart card architectures (e.g. Java Card, Multos and<br />

GlobalPlat<strong>for</strong>m).<br />

4.2.1 Spaces<br />

A space is a memory container that holds collections of services or applications (i.e.<br />

domains). As depicted in gure 4.1 there are two spaces: plat<strong>for</strong>m space and application<br />

space. The plat<strong>for</strong>m space is owned by the smart card plat<strong>for</strong>m itself so that users do not<br />

have any control over the services installed in the plat<strong>for</strong>m space. The application space<br />

can be under the control of an o-card entity that may be a centralised authority (i.e.<br />

TSM or card issuer) or the smart card user. In addition, there can be multiple application<br />

spaces on a smart card accommodating a centralised authority and the respective card<br />

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