A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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C.11 Implementation Helper Classes 44 ( byte ) 0x81 , ( byte ) 0xB5 , ( byte ) 0x39 , ( byte ) 0xCC, ( byte ) 0xE3 , 45 ( byte ) 0x40 , ( byte ) 0x9D , ( byte ) 0x13 , ( byte ) 0xCD, ( byte ) 0x56 , 46 ( byte ) 0x6A , ( byte ) 0xFB , ( byte ) 0xB4 , ( byte ) 0x8D , ( byte ) 0x6C , 47 ( byte ) 0x01 , ( byte ) 0x91 , ( byte ) 0x81 , ( byte ) 0xE1 , ( byte ) 0xBC, 48 ( byte ) 0xFE , ( byte ) 0x94 , ( byte ) 0xB3 , ( byte ) 0x02 , ( byte ) 0x69 , 49 ( byte ) 0xED, ( byte ) 0xFE , ( byte ) 0x72 , ( byte ) 0xFE , ( byte ) 0x9B , 50 ( byte ) 0x6A , ( byte ) 0xA4 , ( byte ) 0xBD, ( byte ) 0x7B , ( byte ) 0x5A , 51 ( byte ) 0x0F , ( byte ) 0x1C , ( byte ) 0x71 , ( byte ) 0xCF, ( byte ) 0xFF , 52 ( byte ) 0x4C , ( byte ) 0x19 , ( byte ) 0xC4 , ( byte ) 0x18 , ( byte ) 0xE1 , 53 ( byte ) 0xF6 , ( byte ) 0xEC, ( byte ) 0x01 , ( byte ) 0x79 , ( byte ) 0x81 , 54 ( byte ) 0xBC, ( byte ) 0x08 , ( byte ) 0x7F , ( byte ) 0x2A , ( byte ) 0x70 , 55 ( byte ) 0x65 , ( byte ) 0xB3 , ( byte ) 0x84 , ( byte ) 0xB8 , ( byte ) 0x90 , 56 ( byte ) 0xD3 , ( byte ) 0x19 , ( byte ) 0x1F , ( byte ) 0x2B , ( byte ) 0xFA} ; 57 public byte [ ] dhModulus = {( byte ) 0xAD, 58 ( byte ) 0x10 , ( byte ) 0x7E , ( byte ) 0x1E , ( byte ) 0x91 , ( byte ) 0x23 , 59 ( byte ) 0xA9 , ( byte ) 0xD0 , ( byte ) 0xD6 , ( byte ) 0x60 , ( byte ) 0xFA, 60 ( byte ) 0xA7 , ( byte ) 0x95 , ( byte ) 0x59 , ( byte ) 0xC5 , ( byte ) 0x1F , 61 ( byte ) 0xA2 , ( byte ) 0x0D , ( byte ) 0x64 , ( byte ) 0xE5 , ( byte ) 0x68 , 62 ( byte ) 0x3B , ( byte ) 0x9F , ( byte ) 0xD1 , ( byte ) 0xB5 , ( byte ) 0x4B , 63 ( byte ) 0x15 , ( byte ) 0x97 , ( byte ) 0xB6 , ( byte ) 0x1D , ( byte ) 0x0A , 64 ( byte ) 0x75 , ( byte ) 0xE6 , ( byte ) 0xFA, ( byte ) 0x14 , ( byte ) 0x1D , 65 ( byte ) 0xF9 , ( byte ) 0x5A , ( byte ) 0x56 , ( byte ) 0xDB, ( byte ) 0xAF, 66 ( byte ) 0x9A , ( byte ) 0x3C , ( byte ) 0x40 , ( byte ) 0x7B , ( byte ) 0xA1 , 67 ( byte ) 0xDF, ( byte ) 0x15 , ( byte ) 0xEB, ( byte ) 0x3D , ( byte ) 0x68 , 68 ( byte ) 0x8A , ( byte ) 0x30 , ( byte ) 0x9C , ( byte ) 0x18 , ( byte ) 0x0E , 69 ( byte ) 0x1D , ( byte ) 0xE6 , ( byte ) 0xB8 , ( byte ) 0x5A , ( byte ) 0x12 , 70 ( byte ) 0x74 , ( byte ) 0xA0 , ( byte ) 0xA6 , ( byte ) 0x6D , ( byte ) 0x3F , 71 ( byte ) 0x81 , ( byte ) 0x52 , ( byte ) 0xAD, ( byte ) 0x6A , ( byte ) 0xC2 , 72 ( byte ) 0x12 , ( byte ) 0x90 , ( byte ) 0x37 , ( byte ) 0xC9 , ( byte ) 0xED, 73 ( byte ) 0xEF , ( byte ) 0xDA, ( byte ) 0x4D , ( byte ) 0xF8 , ( byte ) 0xD9 , 74 ( byte ) 0x1E , ( byte ) 0x8F , ( byte ) 0xEF , ( byte ) 0x55 , ( byte ) 0xB7 , 75 ( byte ) 0x39 , ( byte ) 0x4B , ( byte ) 0x7A , ( byte ) 0xD5 , ( byte ) 0xB7 , 76 ( byte ) 0xD0 , ( byte ) 0xB6 , ( byte ) 0xC1 , ( byte ) 0x22 , ( byte ) 0x07 , 77 ( byte ) 0xC9 , ( byte ) 0xF9 , ( byte ) 0x8D , ( byte ) 0x11 , ( byte ) 0xED, 78 ( byte ) 0x34 , ( byte ) 0xDB, ( byte ) 0xF6 , ( byte ) 0xC6 , ( byte ) 0xBA, 79 ( byte ) 0x0B , ( byte ) 0x2C , ( byte ) 0x8B , ( byte ) 0xBC, ( byte ) 0x27 , 80 ( byte ) 0xBE, ( byte ) 0x6A , ( byte ) 0x00 , ( byte ) 0xE0 , ( byte ) 0xA0 , 81 ( byte ) 0xB9 , ( byte ) 0xC4 , ( byte ) 0x97 , ( byte ) 0x08 , ( byte ) 0xB3 , 82 ( byte ) 0xBF , ( byte ) 0x8A , ( byte ) 0x31 , ( byte ) 0x70 , ( byte ) 0x91 , 83 ( byte ) 0x88 , ( byte ) 0x36 , ( byte ) 0x81 , ( byte ) 0x28 , ( byte ) 0x61 , 84 ( byte ) 0x30 , ( byte ) 0xBC, ( byte ) 0x89 , ( byte ) 0x85 , ( byte ) 0xDB, 85 ( byte ) 0x16 , ( byte ) 0x02 , ( byte ) 0xE7 , ( byte ) 0x14 , ( byte ) 0x41 , 86 ( byte ) 0x5D , ( byte ) 0x93 , ( byte ) 0x30 , ( byte ) 0x27 , ( byte ) 0x82 , 87 ( byte ) 0x73 , ( byte ) 0xC7 , ( byte ) 0xDE, ( byte ) 0x31 , ( byte ) 0xEF , 88 ( byte ) 0xDC, ( byte ) 0x73 , ( byte ) 0x10 , ( byte ) 0xF7 , ( byte ) 0x12 , 89 ( byte ) 0x1F , ( byte ) 0xD5 , ( byte ) 0xA0 , ( byte ) 0x74 , ( byte ) 0x15 , 90 ( byte ) 0x98 , ( byte ) 0x7D , ( byte ) 0x9A , ( byte ) 0xDC, ( byte ) 0x0A , 91 ( byte ) 0x48 , ( byte ) 0x6D , ( byte ) 0xCD, ( byte ) 0xF9 , ( byte ) 0x3A , 92 ( byte ) 0xCC, ( byte ) 0x44 , ( byte ) 0x32 , ( byte ) 0x83 , ( byte ) 0x87 , 93 ( byte ) 0x31 , ( byte ) 0x5D , ( byte ) 0x75 , ( byte ) 0xE1 , ( byte ) 0x98 , 94 ( byte ) 0xC6 , ( byte ) 0x41 , ( byte ) 0xA4 , ( byte ) 0x80 , ( byte ) 0xCD, 444
C.11 Implementation Helper Classes 95 ( byte ) 0x86 , ( byte ) 0xA1 , ( byte ) 0xB9 , ( byte ) 0xE5 , ( byte ) 0x87 , 96 ( byte ) 0xE8 , ( byte ) 0xBE, ( byte ) 0x60 , ( byte ) 0xE6 , ( byte ) 0x9C , 97 ( byte ) 0xC9 , ( byte ) 0x28 , ( byte ) 0xB2 , ( byte ) 0xB9 , ( byte ) 0xC5 , 98 ( byte ) 0x21 , ( byte ) 0x72 , ( byte ) 0xE4 , ( byte ) 0x13 , ( byte ) 0x04 , 99 ( byte ) 0x2E , ( byte ) 0x9B , ( byte ) 0x23 , ( byte ) 0xF1 , ( byte ) 0x0B , 100 ( byte ) 0x0E , ( byte ) 0x16 , ( byte ) 0xE7 , ( byte ) 0x97 , ( byte ) 0x63 , 101 ( byte ) 0xC9 , ( byte ) 0xB5 , ( byte ) 0x3D , ( byte ) 0xCF, ( byte ) 0x4B , 102 ( byte ) 0xA8 , ( byte ) 0x0A , ( byte ) 0x29 , ( byte ) 0xE3 , ( byte ) 0xFB , 103 ( byte ) 0x73 , ( byte ) 0xC1 , ( byte ) 0x6B , ( byte ) 0x8E , ( byte ) 0x75 , 104 ( byte ) 0xB9 , ( byte ) 0x7E , ( byte ) 0xF3 , ( byte ) 0x63 , ( byte ) 0xE2 , 105 ( byte ) 0xFF , ( byte ) 0xA3 , ( byte ) 0x1F , ( byte ) 0x71 , ( byte ) 0xCF, 106 ( byte ) 0x9D , ( byte ) 0xE5 , ( byte ) 0x38 , ( byte ) 0x4E , ( byte ) 0x71 , 107 ( byte ) 0xB8 , ( byte ) 0x1C , ( byte ) 0x0A , ( byte ) 0xC4 , ( byte ) 0xDF, 108 ( byte ) 0xFE , ( byte ) 0x0C , ( byte ) 0x10 , ( byte ) 0xE6 , ( byte ) 0x4F } ; 109 } C.11.4 SHA256 Pseudorandom Number Generator The Pseudorandom Number Generator (PRNG) algorithm used during the attestation mechanism is based on the SHA 256 and its implementation is listed as below: 1 package prngSHA256 ; 2 3 import javacard . framework . Applet ; 4 import javacard . framework . ISO7816 ; 5 import javacard . framework . ISOException ; 6 import javacard . framework . JCSystem ; 7 import javacard . framework . U t i l ; 8 import javacard . s e c u r i t y . MessageDigest ; 9 public class PrngSHA256 extends Applet { 10 private s t a t i c byte [ ] C y c l i c S e e d F i l e = { 11 ( byte ) 0x49 , ( byte ) 0x29 , ( byte ) 0x8e , ( byte ) 0 x5f , ( byte ) 0xd3 , ( byte ) 12 0x61 , ( byte ) 0xc9 , ( byte ) 0xd2 , ( byte ) 0x88 , ( byte ) 0x4c , ( byte ) 0 xfa , 13 ( byte ) 0xd5 , ( byte ) 0xcb , ( byte ) 0 x9f , ( byte ) 0x93 , ( byte ) 0x91 , 14 ( byte ) 0x26 , ( byte ) 0xba , ( byte ) 0x65 , ( byte ) 0xd0 , ( byte ) 0x0c , 15 ( byte ) 0x7c , ( byte ) 0x5e , ( byte ) 0x74 , ( byte ) 0x92 , ( byte ) 0x00 , 16 ( byte ) 0x47 , ( byte ) 0xa5 , ( byte ) 0x74 , ( byte ) 0x44 , ( byte ) 0xe1 , 17 ( byte ) 0xc2 , ( byte ) 0x14 , ( byte ) 0x9e , ( byte ) 0 x f f , ( byte ) 0xe8 , 18 ( byte ) 0x77 , ( byte ) 0x62 , ( byte ) 0x95 , ( byte ) 0x0b , ( byte ) 0x10 , 19 ( byte ) 0x5d , ( byte ) 0 xf8 , ( byte ) 0x66 , ( byte ) 0x12 , ( byte ) 0x12 , 20 ( byte ) 0x79 , ( byte ) 0x9d , ( byte ) 0x83 , ( byte ) 0 xbf , ( byte ) 0x74 , 21 ( byte ) 0xae , ( byte ) 0xd2 , ( byte ) 0x45 , ( byte ) 0 xf9 , ( byte ) 0x01 , 22 ( byte ) 0x54 , ( byte ) 0x22 , ( byte ) 0xbb , ( byte ) 0x39 , ( byte ) 0 xf8 , 23 ( byte ) 0 xf0 , ( byte ) 0xe2 , ( byte ) 0x4e , ( byte ) 0 xec , ( byte ) 0 x2f , 24 ( byte ) 0x26 , ( byte ) 0x38 , ( byte ) 0x95 , ( byte ) 0x06 , ( byte ) 0x79 , 25 ( byte ) 0x0d , ( byte ) 0x4c , ( byte ) 0xdb , ( byte ) 0x58 , ( byte ) 0x12 , 26 ( byte ) 0xeb , ( byte ) 0 xf2 , ( byte ) 0 xee , ( byte ) 0x92 , ( byte ) 0xde , 27 ( byte ) 0 x9f , ( byte ) 0x51 , ( byte ) 0x8a , ( byte ) 0xb4 , ( byte ) 0x1a , 28 ( byte ) 0xcb , ( byte ) 0x46 , ( byte ) 0x84 , ( byte ) 0x8a , ( byte ) 0x28 , 29 ( byte ) 0xa4 , ( byte ) 0x15 , ( byte ) 0 xdf , ( byte ) 0x21 , ( byte ) 0xa6 , 30 ( byte ) 0xcd , ( byte ) 0x88 , ( byte ) 0xdb , ( byte ) 0x01 , ( byte ) 0x07 , 445
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A User Centric Security Model for T
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Declaration These doctoral studies
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R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, and
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Abstract In this thesis we propose
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CONTENTS 3.4.1 Supplier . . . . . .
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CONTENTS 7 Application Sharing Mech
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CONTENTS C.4 Secure and Trusted Cha
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LIST OF FIGURES 8.6 Control ow diag
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List of Abbreviations AAC Applicati
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1.1 Setting the Scene 1.1 Setting t
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1.2 A Brief History of Smart Cards
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1.3 Motivation and Challenges Over
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1.3 Motivation and Challenges compu
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1.4 Contributions the UCTD manufact
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1.5 Structure of the Thesis traditi
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Chapter 2 User Centric Tamper-Resis
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2.2 Rationale for a User Centric Ta
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2.2 Rationale for a User Centric Ta
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2.3 Candidates for User Centric Tam
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Businesses Governments Privacy Pres
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2.4 The User Centric Tamper-Resista
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2.5 Case Studies an enrolment proce
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2.5 Case Studies issued the applica
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Chapter 3 Smart Card Ownership Mode
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3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Owner
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3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Owner
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM which i
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM Applica
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM which i
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM Element
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3.4 User Centric Smart Card Ownersh
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3.5 Security and Operational Requir
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Service Provider 3.6 Coopetitive Ar
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Chapter 4 User Centric Smart Card A
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4.2 Platform Architecture Platform
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4.2 Platform Architecture manager c
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4.3 Trusted Environment & Execution
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4.4 Security Assurance and Validati
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms 4.5 Atte
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms rational
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms otherwis
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4.6 Device Ownership 4.6.2 User Own
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4.7 Attestation Protocol can succes
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4.7 Attestation Protocol an adversa
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4.7 Attestation Protocol SC i ′ a
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4.8 Protocol Analysis CasperFDR app
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4.9 Summary whereas the online atte
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5.1 Introduction 5.1 Introduction E
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5.2 GlobalPlatform Card Management
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5.3 Multos Card Management Framewor
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5.4 Proposed Smart Card Management
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5.4 Proposed Smart Card Management
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5.5 Card Management-Related Issues
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Chapter 6 Secure and Trusted Channe
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols 6.2 Se
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols smart
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols SOG-16
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols Notati
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6.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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6.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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6.5 Application Acquisition and Con
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6.6 Analysis of the Proposed Protoc
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6.7 Summary For the STCP ACA , we n
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Chapter 7 Application Sharing Mecha
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism 7
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism I
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism a
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7.3 UCTD Firewall utilises CDAM to
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7.3 UCTD Firewall application. Ther
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7.3 UCTD Firewall 7.3.6 Cross-Devic
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7.3 UCTD Firewall and asynchronous
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7.3 UCTD Firewall Table 7.2: Protoc
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7.4 Application Binding Protocol L
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7.5 Platform Binding Protocol The r
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7.6 Application Binding Protocol D
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Chapter 8 Smart Card Runtime Enviro
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8.2 Smart Card Runtime Environment
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism In
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism it
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism er
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism id
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism Th
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8.4 Analysis of the Runtime Protect
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8.4 Analysis of the Runtime Protect
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8.5 Summary representation; the abs
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Chapter 9 Backup, Migration, and De
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9.2 Backup and Migration Framework
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9.2 Backup and Migration Framework
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9.3 Application Deletion tion of th
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9.3 Application Deletion The deleti
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9.3 Application Deletion authorises
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9.5 Summary 9.5 Summary In this cha
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10.1 Summary and Conclusions 10.1 S
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10.1 Summary and Conclusions giving
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10.2 Recommendations for Future Wor
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Appendix A Description of Protocols
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A.3 Aziz-Die (AD) Protocol on the p
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A.5 Just-Fast-Keying (JFK) Protocol
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A.8 Markantonakis-Mayes (MM) Protoc
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A.9 Sirett-Mayes-Markantonakis (SM)
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B.1 Brief Introduction to the Caspe
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B.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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B.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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B.6 Application Binding Protocol L
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B.7 Platform Binding Protocol B.7 P
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B.8 Application Binding Protocol D
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism C.1
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 93 (
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 194
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 47 (
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 148
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C.2 Online Attestation Mechanism C.
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C.2 Online Attestation Mechanism 10
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 15 import
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 112 f a l
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 214 } 215
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 312 inLeng
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 410 this .
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 7 import j
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 107 this .
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 204 ( this
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 302 } 303
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C.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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C.6 Application Acquisition and Con
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C.7 Application Binding Protocol -
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Page 451 and 452: BIBLIOGRAPHY August 2009, pp. 2035.
Page 453 and 454: BIBLIOGRAPHY Available: http://www.
Page 455 and 456: BIBLIOGRAPHY Institute of Technolog
Page 457 and 458: BIBLIOGRAPHY ing, vol. 2, pp. 42342
Page 459 and 460: BIBLIOGRAPHY Available: http://csrc
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Page 467 and 468: BIBLIOGRAPHY [208] T. S. Messerges,
Page 469: BIBLIOGRAPHY Science, P. Samarati,
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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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