06.11.2014 Views

A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

7.3 UCTD Firewall<br />

Firewall<br />

Application A (Client)<br />

Requesting<br />

Permision ResAllocation(ResourceObjectRef, Lifetime)<br />

Component<br />

ACL<br />

Req(ClientAID, EBindingKey(),Access Permission,<br />

Resource Required, Random Number)<br />

RequestService<br />

Application B (Server)<br />

ACL<br />

ARM<br />

Permision<br />

Permision<br />

Shareable Resources<br />

Figure 7.4: Application shareable resource access request process<br />

Subsequently it checks the access permission <strong>for</strong> the client application (from the server application's<br />

ACL). If the client application is authorised to access the requested resource,<br />

the ARM will return the resource's object reference along with the sharing lifetime.<br />

There are two lifetime modes, permanent grant of access to an object or temporary. In<br />

permanent mode, the server application grants the ownership of the object to the client<br />

application as proposed by the Java Card 3.1 connected edition rewall [16]. In temporary<br />

mode access is limited to individual sessions and ownership of the object is retained by the<br />

server application.<br />

7.3.4 Privilege Modication<br />

The SP of a server application can modify the privileges of a client application by updating<br />

the ACLs. The ARM of the server application veries the initiator's (SP's) identity and<br />

credentials, be<strong>for</strong>e allowing the update of the ACL(s). The implementation of the privilege<br />

modication is at the sole discretion of the SP. Such an update could be similar to application<br />

update mechanisms already deployed, notably Over-The-Air updates in (U)SIM<br />

application [6].<br />

7.3.5 Application-Plat<strong>for</strong>m Communication<br />

At the time of installation, an application establishes bidirectional resource sharing with the<br />

plat<strong>for</strong>m. The application can access those plat<strong>for</strong>m APIs that are stipulated in the SP's<br />

Application Lease Policy (ALP) discussed in section 3.4.6, and the plat<strong>for</strong>m obtains the<br />

shared resources of the applications that are necessary to initiate the application execution.<br />

The plat<strong>for</strong>m security context does not have global access in the UCTDs. This is to avoid<br />

any possible exploitation of the plat<strong>for</strong>m that could lead to in<strong>for</strong>mation leakage (data or<br />

code) from an application. The resource-sharing delegation is disabled in the plat<strong>for</strong>mapplication<br />

communication and the rewall will deny such requests to avoid any illegal<br />

access to the APIs by an application through resource sharing delegation.<br />

168

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!