A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

Chapter 3
Smart Card Ownership Models
Contents
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (ICOM) . . . . . 53
3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.4 User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) . . . . . 65
3.5 Security and Operational Requirements of the UCOM . . . . . 70
3.6 Coopetitive Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
In this chapter, we open the discussion with a description of the ICOM framework and the
security and operational assumptions adopted in the ICOM, along with a short introduction
to the widely deployed smart card frameworks which support the ICOM. We then provide an
overview of the User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) and its major stakeholders.
The discussion then moves to the security and operational requirements of UCOM
stakeholders. We then extend the UCOM model to include an administrative authority that
manages the UCTD while providing the user with freedom of choice. This model is referred
to as the Coopetitive Architecture for Smart Cards (CASC).
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