06.11.2014 Views

A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

3.1 Introduction<br />

3.1 Introduction<br />

The ICOM has played a major role in the spread of smart card technology to every aspect<br />

of modern life. Card issuers see smart cards as a conduit <strong>for</strong> customer loyalty, rather than<br />

as a mere electronic device used to access services. Smart cards have become a market<br />

presence, a means of customer outreach and even in certain circumstances a status symbol<br />

(i.e. privilege cards). Given all the above, it is obvious why surrendering control of smart<br />

cards is a dicult decision <strong>for</strong> any organisation to contemplate. In this chapter, we describe<br />

the ICOM architecture along with prominent plat<strong>for</strong>ms that support it.<br />

The aim of a UCTD is to provide security, trust, and privacy services while being interoperable<br />

with diverse computing devices (e.g. computers, mobile phones, and tablets).<br />

The ownership model <strong>for</strong> the UCTD has to strike a balance between the user's freedom<br />

of choice and the SP's requirements of security, intellectual property protection, control,<br />

and reliability of their application. For this purpose, we propose the UCOM because it<br />

takes into account the ownership requirements of the UCTD framework. There<strong>for</strong>e, in this<br />

chapter we discuss the UCOM architecture, its main stakeholders, and their requirements.<br />

In some cases, there is a need to have an administrative authority that manages a computing<br />

plat<strong>for</strong>m. Two examples of such an authority can be parents and MNOs. On a<br />

computing plat<strong>for</strong>m used by children, the respective parents would like to manage the<br />

overall plat<strong>for</strong>m while giving the children the right to install or delete any application<br />

that does not violate the policy dened by the parents. Similarly, an MNO might provide<br />

a mobile handset to a customer in return <strong>for</strong> signing a xed term contract. During the<br />

contract period, the MNO might be involved with the UCTD that came with the mobile<br />

handset and they might want to have the administrative rights to it. We propose a model<br />

that accommodates the requirement of administrative authority on a UCTD (smart card),<br />

while adhering to the UCOM. Such a model will protect the security and privacy of the<br />

user, while implementing the usage policy dened by the administrative authority. We<br />

refer to this model as Coopetitive Architecture <strong>for</strong> Smart Cards (CASC), which is also<br />

discussed in this chapter.<br />

Structure of the Chapter: Section 3.2 discusses the ICOM and its advantages and disadvantages.<br />

In section 3.3, we briey introduce prominent plat<strong>for</strong>ms that support the ICOM<br />

framework. In section 3.4, we describe the ICOM and its major components. The security<br />

and operational requirements of individual UCOM stakeholders are discussed in section<br />

3.5. The extension to the UCOM framework to include provision <strong>for</strong> an administrative<br />

authority is described in section 3.6. Finally, we conclude the chapter in section 3.7.<br />

Be<strong>for</strong>e diving into the chapter, we want to explain that the discussion of dierent management<br />

models in the previous chapter and in this chapter is necessary to appreciate our<br />

52

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!