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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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7.6 Application Binding Protocol Distributed<br />

ABPL uses symmetric cryptography to establish the keying material whereas the ABPD<br />

uses asymmetric cryptography.<br />

7.6.1 Protocol Prerequisite<br />

The protocol prerequisite <strong>for</strong> the ABPD is an extension to the prerequisites of the ABPL<br />

that are PPR-14 to PPR-16. The extension of the protocol prerequisite is listed below:<br />

PPR-18 Plat<strong>for</strong>m Binding: A plat<strong>for</strong>m binding is established between the smart cards,<br />

whose applications want to establish an application binding. This means that<br />

both smart cards have executed the PBP, described in the previous section.<br />

7.6.2 Protocol Description<br />

The ABPD is executed between two applications that have an application sharing engagement.<br />

The protocol listed in this section accommodates the ABP when the two applications<br />

are installed on two distinct devices. In the protocol discussed below, the CL resides on<br />

the SCA and SE on SCB.<br />

ABPD-1. CL : au = f KSE→CL (CL i ||SE i ||SPi<br />

CL ||SPi SE ||g r CL||N CL )<br />

CL → SE : g r CL||N CL ||au||DH Group<br />

SE : K DH = (g r CL) r SE<br />

mod n<br />

SE : K SE−CL = f KDH (N SC a||N SC b||1)<br />

SE : mK SE−CL = f KDH (N SC a||N SC b||2)<br />

The protocol is initiated by the CL, which generates a Die-Hellman exponential (g r CL )<br />

and a random number. In addition, the application CL also generates a keyed hash of<br />

identities of the participating applications, and their respective SPs along with g r CL and<br />

N CL . The rationale behind the generation of the keyed hash value is to avoid a man-inthe-middle<br />

attack on the rst message. To mount this attack, a malicious user has to gain<br />

knowledge of identities of individual applications and associated SPs, and the secret key<br />

(K SE→CL ). This message cannot prevent replay attacks, which we deal with in subsequent<br />

messages. The message is then appended with the DH Group , which details the supported<br />

Die-Hellman group used to generate the g r CL .<br />

On receipt of message one, the SE will verify the authentication credentials (i.e. keyed<br />

hash) and on a successful outcome, it will continue with the protocol. The application<br />

SE will generate a Die-Hellman exponential and a random number. The application SE<br />

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