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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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3.3 Frameworks <strong>for</strong> the ICOM<br />

which it was dicult to bring dierent organisations to share the same smart card plat<strong>for</strong>m.<br />

The change from perceiving the smart card as a security token to seeing it as a loyalty and<br />

marketing medium imposed additional restrictions on it. There<strong>for</strong>e, users cannot choose<br />

to put an application on their smart cards; the privilege of an installing applications was<br />

zealously and solely retained by the card issuers, leaving users with a restricted use of the<br />

smart card plat<strong>for</strong>m.<br />

Service Roll-out. With the ICOM, a card issuer has to acquire smart cards from a<br />

card manufacturer and then either develop application(s) itself or acquire them from the<br />

card manufacture or a third party. Once the cards are acquired and they have the card<br />

issuer's application, they are posted to individual customers. This process is cyclic: the<br />

card issuer may have to reissue new smart cards because of expiry of old ones or it may<br />

want to introduce new services or meet new regulatory/legal requirements. Furthermore,<br />

it takes a long time to oer new services in the ICOM, since an issuer has to order new<br />

smart cards and install new applications on them and then has to issue these smart cards<br />

to individual customers. Generally, new services are issued gradually at the time when the<br />

issued smart cards are nearing the end of their lifecycle.<br />

Costly. With the ICOM the cost <strong>for</strong> card issuers is incurred in two ways. The rst<br />

is acquiring smart cards and getting them certied 4 (third party evaluation of security)<br />

to meet any regulatory, standardisation or legal requirements. The second is the loss of<br />

possible revenue in the service roll-out period or in the process of issuing a replacement<br />

smart card. For example, if a cardholder loses a smart card and requests a new card it<br />

usually takes from three days to a week (or sometimes more) in the case of the banking<br />

industry be<strong>for</strong>e he/she receives it. In industries like telecom and transport the user might<br />

acquire the card immediately from designated outlets. However, smart cards deployed in<br />

the health sector or national identity cards might have longer re-issue waiting periods.<br />

During this period, the customer cannot use the service(s) of the particular card issuer,<br />

and this might result in loss of revenue and inconvenience <strong>for</strong> the user.<br />

3.3 Frameworks <strong>for</strong> the ICOM<br />

In this thesis, we analyse in some detail the dierent components of the ICOM frameworks<br />

as required, to contrast them with those of the UCOM. For articulation of our arguments,<br />

we are not going to dive into the technical details of each ICOM framework in subse-<br />

4 <strong>Security</strong> Certication: For certain industries like banking, smart cards oered by the card manufacturers<br />

have third party security evaluation as a standard product requirement. However, other industries<br />

like telecom and transport often does not require such evaluations.<br />

57

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