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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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7.3 UCTD Firewall<br />

Encrypted and MACed using PBP Keys<br />

Server SC-ID<br />

Client SC-ID<br />

Server AID<br />

Client AID<br />

Sharing Request (Payload)<br />

Encrypted and MACed using ABP Keys<br />

Figure 7.6: Cross-Device Application Sharing message<br />

The provision of whether an application supports cross-device application sharing is at<br />

the sole discretion of the respective SP. The UCTD architecture will provide two levels<br />

of application sharing: a) localised sharing, and b) cross-device sharing. The rst option<br />

restricts the application sharing to the smart card on which the application is installed.<br />

Any client application that is not installed on it will not be able to access the shareable<br />

resources of the server application. This scenario is implemented in traditional smart card<br />

rewalls and supported by the UCTD. The second option allows application sharing with<br />

a client application, whether or not it is installed on the same plat<strong>for</strong>m.<br />

In a succinct manner, we can divide the CDAM process into four steps listed as below:<br />

1. Registration: The rst step involves registration of individual applications with their<br />

respective smart cards, and individual smart cards with their respective CAMS.<br />

2. Plat<strong>for</strong>m Binding: A new smart card that is recently registered with the CAMS will<br />

ask the CAMS to provide a list of available (registered) smart cards. The CAMS<br />

provides the pseudo identities of other associated smart cards. Each smart card<br />

then initiates a dialogue referred as plat<strong>for</strong>m binding with other smart cards in the<br />

network and establishes a secure relationship (e.g. by means of a shared cryptographic<br />

key) that is termed as plat<strong>for</strong>m binding key. The plat<strong>for</strong>m binding is similar to the<br />

application binding discussed in section 7.3.2 but is between smart cards, rather than<br />

applications. After the acknowledgement of the plat<strong>for</strong>m binding, each smart card<br />

will register the other in its list of bound plat<strong>for</strong>ms.<br />

3. Application Binding in CDAM: In the third step, client and server applications proceed<br />

with the application binding process that on its successful conclusion binds them<br />

in a way that enables them to share resources in a secure and reliable manner.<br />

4. Application Sharing in CDAM: The client application requests its host smart card<br />

regarding the status of the server application's host smart card. If the server application<br />

is in the network then it will proceed with the application sharing. The<br />

application binding key is used to generate the session key to communicate with the<br />

server application. The structure of the message is illustrated in gure 7.6.<br />

The resource access can be based on two mechanisms: Java Card [28] or Multos [29] interapplication<br />

communication architecture. These two mechanisms represent the synchronous<br />

170

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