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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism<br />

FiR-2 Application Authentication: In both Java Card and Multos, applications rely on<br />

the AID to locate, request and access shareable resources/data. The AID is a 516<br />

byte identier that consists of two components: a Registered Identier (RID) and<br />

a Proprietary Application Identier Extension (PIX). The RID is 5 bytes long and<br />

compulsory; on the other hand the PIX can be 09 bytes long and it is optional. If<br />

you are developing an application that will be used either nationally or internationally,<br />

you need to get a RID from designated authorities (i.e. national standardisation<br />

authorities). AIDs are issued by a designated authority but there is no en<strong>for</strong>cement<br />

mechanism that prevents an adversary from masquerading as an application on a<br />

smart card. In the ICOM, this situation does not arise because application installation<br />

is only authorised by the card issuer and even this is to a restricted group of<br />

trusted application providers. However, in the UCTD environment such a measure<br />

is dicult.<br />

FiR-3 Application State Validation: An application App A might be modied either intentionally<br />

or accidentally. This might have a malign aect on applications that<br />

share resources with, or use the resources of App A . There<strong>for</strong>e, be<strong>for</strong>e establishing<br />

sharing it would be benecial to ascertain the current state of App A . In addition,<br />

the rewall should also notify the server application if the client application is modied<br />

(i.e. if there have been application updates), so if the client application wants,<br />

it can revoke the sharing, and vice versa.<br />

FiR-4 Access Control: The rewall should facilitate a exible mechanism that enables a<br />

server application to implement a hierarchical access-level rewall. In such a rewall,<br />

a server application assigns shareable resources according to dierent access levels.<br />

In addition, it can also revoke, upgrade, or demote the existing privileges of a client<br />

application.<br />

FiR-5 Application Binding: Two applications that share each other's resources should<br />

be able to bind the sharing instance (cryptographic binding) in order to provide<br />

authentication, condentiality and reliability to all future communication.<br />

FiR-6 Application-Plat<strong>for</strong>m Communication. This requirement deals with bi-directional<br />

communication between an application and a smart card plat<strong>for</strong>m and it is subdivided<br />

into two sections as listed below.<br />

(a) Application to Plat<strong>for</strong>m Communication: Plat<strong>for</strong>ms make their services available<br />

to applications either through Entry Point Objects [28] or standard APIs<br />

[29]. In both cases, applications may have access to more plat<strong>for</strong>m services<br />

than required. That would not be desirable in the UCTD [10]. In the UCTD,<br />

applications are only given access to those plat<strong>for</strong>m services that are authorised<br />

by their SPs. The rewall ensures that an application cannot have access<br />

to any other services from the plat<strong>for</strong>m <strong>for</strong> which it is not authorised. This<br />

162

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