A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

B.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol Smart Card
EKey: Agent -> PublicKey
DKey: Agent -> SecretKey
InverseKeys = (sessionKey, sessionKey),(VKey, SKey),(EKey, DKey),(Exp, Exp),\
(Gen, Gen)
#Protocol description
0. -> SP : TPM
1. SP -> TPM : SP, VKey(SP)
2. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, nt}{VKey(SP)}
2a. TPM -> SP : {Exp(Gen, t) % halfkeyTPM} {VKey(SP)}
3. SP -> TPM : {SP, TPM, ns}{EKey(TPM)}
3a. SP -> TPM : {Exp(Gen, s) % halfkeySP} {EKey(TPM)}
4. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, {scos (+) ns}{SKey(TPM)}}{sessionKey}
5. SP -> TPM : {SP, TPM, nt}{sessionKey}
6. TPM -> SP : {TPM, SP, {app (+) ns}{SKey(TPM)}}{sessionKey}
#Actual variables
SerPro, TruPlaMan, MAppl : Agent
Nsp, Ntpm, Nm : Nonce
SCOS, APP : Nonce
S, T, M : Num
SCOperatingSys, SApplication : Nonce
#Processes
INITIATOR(SP, TPM, ns, s, app, scos) knows
RESPONDER(TPM, SP, nt, t, scos, app) knows
SKey(SP), DKey(SP), VKey, EKey
SKey(TPM), DKey(TPM), VKey, EKey
#System
INITIATOR(SerPro, TruPlaMan, Nsp, S, APP, SCOS)
RESPONDER(TruPlaMan, SerPro, Ntpm, T, SCOS, APP)
#Functions
symbolic VKey, SKey, EKey, DKey
#Intruder Information
Intruder = MAppl
IntruderKnowledge = {SerPro, TruPlaMan, MAppl, MAppl, Nm, DKey(MAppl),\
SKey(MAppl), VKey, EKey, M}
#Specification
StrongSecret(SP, sessionKey, [TPM])
Aliveness(SP, TPM)
Aliveness(TPM, SP)
Agreement(SP, TPM, [sessionKey])
Agreement(TPM, SP, [sessionKey])
#Equivalences
forall x, y : Num . Exp(Exp(Gen, x), y) = Exp(Exp (Gen, y), x)
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