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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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3.7 Summary<br />

<strong>for</strong> the MNO's application. At the end of the contract, the MNO would not only unlock<br />

the mobile phone but also the TSM. From this point <strong>for</strong>ward, the user can either use the<br />

secure element under UCOM architecture or register their secure element with any other<br />

TSM (or continue with the original MNO).<br />

Similarly, other entities like card issuing banks, transport service operators, smart card<br />

and mobile phone manufacturers, or independent third parties, can participate by oering<br />

competitive products that adhere to the CASC. The security and reliability of the coopetitive<br />

smart cards would be a key issue, which is dealt with separately in the ICOM and<br />

UCOM scenarios.<br />

3.7 Summary<br />

In this chapter, we have discussed the Issuer <strong>Centric</strong> Smart Card Ownership <strong>Model</strong> along<br />

with dierent smart card frameworks that have been proposed to support the ICOM. In<br />

addition, this chapter serves as a basic introduction to the UCOM framework and its<br />

main stakeholders. We have also dened the roles of each of these stakeholders along with<br />

their security and operational requirements. Furthermore, we have extended the UCOM<br />

architecture to represent a more viable and dynamic architecture <strong>for</strong> the UCTD that might<br />

require administrative control.<br />

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