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A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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6.1 Introduction<br />

6.1 Introduction<br />

Secure Channel Protocols (SCPs) are designed to provide a secure communications channel.<br />

They typically start by providing entity authentication and authenticated key establishment.<br />

There are many dierent protocols proposed <strong>for</strong> internet and smart card<br />

environments that satisfy dierent (pre-dened) design goals. Not all protocols can be<br />

used <strong>for</strong> every possible scenario; if this was possible, we would not have the diversity of<br />

SCPs that we have today.<br />

The UCTD architecture has its own set of security and operational goals <strong>for</strong> an SCP has<br />

to satisfy. These goals range from traditional SCP ones like entity authentication and<br />

mutual key generation, to UCOM-specic requirements like smart card state validation.<br />

In this chapter, we examine a non-exhaustive list of security and operational goals <strong>for</strong> the<br />

UCTD environment. The dened list is considered adequate to gauge the basic security<br />

requirements of the UCTD and related stakeholders (section 3.5).<br />

An SCP in the UCTD can take many dierent <strong>for</strong>ms, and we discuss three possible variants.<br />

The rst two variants are based on the UCOM architecture and the dierences between<br />

them is determined by who initiates the protocol, and whether it is a smart card or an<br />

SP. The third protocol caters to the CASC environment and involves an administrative<br />

authority during the protocol execution.<br />

The proposed protocols are in<strong>for</strong>mally analysed, based on the pre-dened security and<br />

operational requirements. We also provide a comparison between the proposed protocols<br />

and a set of protocols ranging from the internet and smart card environments. We also<br />

provide a <strong>for</strong>mal-mechanical proof <strong>for</strong> the proposed protocols using the CasperFDR tool,<br />

along with test implementation and per<strong>for</strong>mance measurements.<br />

Structure of the Chapter: The chapter begins with a discussion of the rationale behind<br />

the SCPs in section 6.2. In this section we also discuss minimum security and operational<br />

requirements stipulated <strong>for</strong> the UCTD environment. Section 6.3, discusses the proposed<br />

SCP that is initiated by an SP, and section 6.4 details the SCP initiated by a smart<br />

card. The SCP that focuses on the administrative management architecture of the UCTD<br />

(section 5.4.1) is described in section 6.5. Section 6.6 provides the in<strong>for</strong>mal analysis,<br />

mechanical <strong>for</strong>mal analysis and test implementations of the proposed protocols.<br />

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