A User Centric Security Model for Tamper-Resistant Devices

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CONTENTS 4.8.2 Protocol Verication by CasperFDR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 4.8.3 Implementation Results & Performance Measurements . . . . . . . . 107 4.8.4 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 4.9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 5 Smart Card Management Architecture 110 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 5.2 GlobalPlatform Card Management Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 5.2.1 Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 5.2.2 Support for Trusted Service Manager Architecture . . . . . . . . . . 113 5.3 Multos Card Management Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 5.3.1 Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 5.3.2 Support for Trusted Service Manager Architecture . . . . . . . . . . 115 5.4 Proposed Smart Card Management Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 5.4.1 Administrative Management Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 5.4.2 User Management Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 5.4.3 Types of Application Leases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 5.4.4 Possible Relationships between a Cardholder and an SP . . . . . . . 119 5.4.5 Application Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 5.4.6 Application Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 5.5 Card Management-Related Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 5.5.1 Simulator Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 5.5.2 User Ownership Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 5.5.3 Parasite Application Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 5.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 6 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol 127 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128 6.2 Secure Channel Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 6.2.1 Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 6.2.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 6.2.3 Minimum Security and Operational Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 6.2.4 Protocol Notation and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 6.2.5 Pre-protocol Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 6.2.6 Protocol Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 6.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol Service Provider . . . . . . . . . . 136 6.3.1 Protocol Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 6.3.2 Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 6.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Protocol Smart Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 6.4.1 Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 6.5 Application Acquisition and Contractual Agreement Protocol . . . . . . . . 141 6.5.1 Enrolment Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 6.5.2 Protocol Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 6.5.3 Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 6.6 Analysis of the Proposed Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 6.6.1 Informal Analysis of the Proposed Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146 6.6.2 CasperFDR Analysis of the Proposed Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 6.6.3 Revisiting the Requirements and Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 6.6.4 Implementation Results and Performance Measurements . . . . . . . 154 6.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 10
CONTENTS 7 Application Sharing Mechanisms 157 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 7.2.1 Firewall Mechanism in Java Card . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 7.2.2 Firewall Mechanism in Multos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160 7.2.3 Rationale for User Centric Smart Card Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 7.3 UCTD Firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 7.3.1 Firewall Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 7.3.2 Application Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166 7.3.3 Using Shareable Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 7.3.4 Privilege Modication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 7.3.5 Application-Platform Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168 7.3.6 Cross-Device Application Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 7.3.7 Minimum Goals and Requirements for the Proposed Protocols . . . . 171 7.3.8 Protocol Notation and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 7.3.9 Enrolment Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 7.4 Application Binding Protocol Local . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 7.4.1 Protocol Prerequisites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 7.4.2 Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 7.5 Platform Binding Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 7.5.1 Protocol Prerequisite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 7.5.2 Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 7.6 Application Binding Protocol Distributed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178 7.6.1 Protocol Prerequisite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 7.6.2 Protocol Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 7.7 Analysis of the Proposed Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 7.7.1 Informal Analysis of the Proposed Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181 7.7.2 Revisiting the Requirements and Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 7.7.3 CasperFDR Analysis of the Proposed Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 7.7.4 Implementation Results and Performance Measurements . . . . . . . 184 7.8 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186 8 Smart Card Runtime Environment 187 8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188 8.2 Smart Card Runtime Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 8.2.1 Java Card Virtual Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 8.2.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192 8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 8.3.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 8.3.2 Attacker's Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196 8.3.3 Overview of the Runtime Protection Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . 197 8.3.4 Application Compilation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198 8.3.5 Execution Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 8.3.6 Runtime Security Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 8.3.7 Runtime Security Counter-Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 8.4 Analysis of the Runtime Protection Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 8.4.1 Security Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 8.4.2 Evaluation Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 8.4.3 Latency Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 8.4.4 Performance Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 11
Page 1 and 2: A User Centric Security Model for T
Page 3 and 4: Declaration These doctoral studies
Page 5 and 6: R. N. Akram, K. Markantonakis, and
Page 7 and 8: Abstract In this thesis we propose
Page 9: CONTENTS 3.4.1 Supplier . . . . . .
Page 13 and 14: CONTENTS C.4 Secure and Trusted Cha
Page 15 and 16: LIST OF FIGURES 8.6 Control ow diag
Page 17 and 18: List of Abbreviations AAC Applicati
Page 19 and 20: 1.1 Setting the Scene 1.1 Setting t
Page 21 and 22: 1.2 A Brief History of Smart Cards
Page 23 and 24: 1.3 Motivation and Challenges Over
Page 25 and 26: 1.3 Motivation and Challenges compu
Page 27 and 28: 1.4 Contributions the UCTD manufact
Page 29 and 30: 1.5 Structure of the Thesis traditi
Page 31 and 32: Chapter 2 User Centric Tamper-Resis
Page 33 and 34: 2.2 Rationale for a User Centric Ta
Page 35 and 36: 2.2 Rationale for a User Centric Ta
Page 37 and 38: 2.3 Candidates for User Centric Tam
Page 43 and 44: Businesses Governments Privacy Pres
Page 45 and 46: 2.4 The User Centric Tamper-Resista
Page 47 and 48: 2.5 Case Studies an enrolment proce
Page 49 and 50: 2.5 Case Studies issued the applica
Page 51 and 52: Chapter 3 Smart Card Ownership Mode
Page 53 and 54: 3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Owner
Page 55 and 56: 3.2 Issuer Centric Smart Card Owner
Page 57 and 58: 3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM which i
Page 59 and 60: 3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM Applica
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM which i
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3.3 Frameworks for the ICOM Element
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3.4 User Centric Smart Card Ownersh
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3.5 Security and Operational Requir
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Service Provider 3.6 Coopetitive Ar
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Chapter 4 User Centric Smart Card A
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4.2 Platform Architecture Platform
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4.2 Platform Architecture manager c
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4.3 Trusted Environment & Execution
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4.4 Security Assurance and Validati
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms 4.5 Atte
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms rational
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4.5 Attestation Mechanisms otherwis
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4.6 Device Ownership 4.6.2 User Own
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4.7 Attestation Protocol can succes
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4.7 Attestation Protocol an adversa
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4.7 Attestation Protocol SC i ′ a
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4.8 Protocol Analysis CasperFDR app
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4.9 Summary whereas the online atte
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5.1 Introduction 5.1 Introduction E
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5.2 GlobalPlatform Card Management
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5.3 Multos Card Management Framewor
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5.4 Proposed Smart Card Management
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5.4 Proposed Smart Card Management
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5.5 Card Management-Related Issues
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Chapter 6 Secure and Trusted Channe
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols 6.2 Se
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols smart
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols SOG-16
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6.2 Secure Channel Protocols Notati
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6.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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6.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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6.5 Application Acquisition and Con
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6.6 Analysis of the Proposed Protoc
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6.7 Summary For the STCP ACA , we n
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Chapter 7 Application Sharing Mecha
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism 7
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism I
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7.2 Application Sharing Mechanism a
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7.3 UCTD Firewall utilises CDAM to
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7.3 UCTD Firewall application. Ther
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7.3 UCTD Firewall 7.3.6 Cross-Devic
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7.3 UCTD Firewall and asynchronous
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7.3 UCTD Firewall Table 7.2: Protoc
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7.4 Application Binding Protocol L
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7.5 Platform Binding Protocol The r
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7.6 Application Binding Protocol D
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Chapter 8 Smart Card Runtime Enviro
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8.2 Smart Card Runtime Environment
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism In
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism it
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism er
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism id
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8.3 Runtime Protection Mechanism Th
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8.4 Analysis of the Runtime Protect
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8.4 Analysis of the Runtime Protect
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8.5 Summary representation; the abs
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Chapter 9 Backup, Migration, and De
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9.2 Backup and Migration Framework
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9.2 Backup and Migration Framework
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9.3 Application Deletion tion of th
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9.3 Application Deletion The deleti
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9.3 Application Deletion authorises
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9.5 Summary 9.5 Summary In this cha
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10.1 Summary and Conclusions 10.1 S
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10.1 Summary and Conclusions giving
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10.2 Recommendations for Future Wor
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Appendix A Description of Protocols
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A.3 Aziz-Die (AD) Protocol on the p
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A.5 Just-Fast-Keying (JFK) Protocol
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A.8 Markantonakis-Mayes (MM) Protoc
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A.9 Sirett-Mayes-Markantonakis (SM)
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B.1 Brief Introduction to the Caspe
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B.3 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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B.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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B.6 Application Binding Protocol L
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B.7 Platform Binding Protocol B.7 P
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B.8 Application Binding Protocol D
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism C.1
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 93 (
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 194
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 47 (
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C.1 Oine Attestation Mechanism 148
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C.2 Online Attestation Mechanism C.
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C.2 Online Attestation Mechanism 10
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 15 import
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 112 f a l
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 214 } 215
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 312 inLeng
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 410 this .
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 7 import j
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 107 this .
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 204 ( this
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C.3 Attestation Protocol 302 } 303
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C.4 Secure and Trusted Channel Prot
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C.6 Application Acquisition and Con
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C.7 Application Binding Protocol -
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 17 im
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 119 p
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 221 i
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 323 c
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 424 +
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 524 S
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 47 (
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 149 J
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 350 +
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 451 p
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C.9 Platform Binding Protocol 552 r
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C.10 Abstract Virtual Machine 42 "
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C.11 Implementation Helper Classes
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BIBLIOGRAPHY August 2009, pp. 2035.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Available: http://www.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Institute of Technolog
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BIBLIOGRAPHY ing, vol. 2, pp. 42342
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Available: http://csrc
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Group_TRUST/PubsPDF/CA
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BIBLIOGRAPHY [208] T. S. Messerges,
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BIBLIOGRAPHY Science, P. Samarati,
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