RD&D-Programme 2004 - SKB

A possible retrieval of deposited canisters also imposes demands on the safeguards system. It
is vital to be able to establish unambiguously the identify of the canisters retrieved. This means
that the marking of the canisters must be very durable. The same applies to the information on
the canister’s contents. Otherwise, the same principles can be applied to retrieval, transport and
interim storage as to the various steps in deposition of the canisters.
Physical protection includes guarding and other measures that are undertaken to protect the fuel
and other radioactive material from theft or sabotage. There is a well-functioning system for
physical protection during handling and transport. At the deep repository facility, the operations
area will be fenced-in and watched by surveillance equipment in a similar manner as at other
nuclear installations. Access to the area will be controlled and checked in a manner similar to
what is done at the nuclear installations in operation today. No physical protection is needed in
a sealed repository. Instead, monitoring can be coordinated with safeguards supervision via for
example satellite surveillance.
Conclusions in RD&D 2001 and its review
In its review of RD&D 2001, SKI stated its opinion that the areas of safeguards and physical
protection of the deep repository were described in very general terms and SKI maintained that
high demands must be made with respect to both safeguards for the fissile material and physical
protection of the same. SKB does not fully concur with this objection, since it is the inspection
bodies Euratom, IAEA and SKI who design safeguards for the deep repository. SKB has a great
interest in cooperating with the inspection bodies at an early stage in order to be able to adapt
the design of the deep repository facility so that safeguards are facilitated.
Newfound knowledge since RD&D 2001
The IAEA, Euratom and SKI collaborate in and organize international working groups for safeguards
for both encapsulation and geological repositories for spent nuclear fuel. SKB believes
that early cooperation with the inspection bodies on safeguards is important to ensure that
the facilities are designed in such a way that safeguards are facilitated. By participating in the
international working groups and “Esarda Working Group on the Back End of the Nuclear Fuel
Cycle” and “IAEA Experts Group on Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological
Repositories”, SKB wishes to ensure an early exchange of information and cooperation.
Among other things, the working groups have received information at the Äspö HRL about
how handling of nuclear materials and deposition of canisters is planned to take place in the
deep repository. SKB also informed the IAEA at a meeting in Oskarshamn /12-8/ how and
what information is gathered during the site investigation phase. At the meeting, SKB also
pointed out the opportunity which the collected information provides to the inspection bodies
for obtaining Primary Baseline data, which may be needed in the future to identify changes that
could indicate diversion of nuclear material.
The whole issue of safeguards will be taken into account when designing the deep repository.
Spaces for monitoring equipment etc are being planned in keeping with the viewpoints of the
inspection bodies, and the facility is being designed with as much transparency as possible.
The trend within safeguards is that traditional safeguards measures (seal, camera inspections,
etc) will be supplemented or partially replaced by indirect controls such as measurements in
the surrounding environment, gathering of open information and unannounced inspections.
This trend will naturally influence the design of the safeguards system at the time of the permit
application. An example of this trend is the so-called additional protocol /12-9/.
Programme
During the period 2005–2010, SKB will keep track of international developments in the field,
but does not plan to conduct any development or demonstration of monitoring equipment or the
like for the safeguards purposes of its own.
142 RD&D-Programme 2004