RD&D-Programme 2004 - SKB

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A possible retrieval of deposited canisters also imposes demands on the safeguards system. It is vital to be able to establish unambiguously the identify of the canisters retrieved. This means that the marking of the canisters must be very durable. The same applies to the information on the canister’s contents. Otherwise, the same principles can be applied to retrieval, transport and interim storage as to the various steps in deposition of the canisters. Physical protection includes guarding and other measures that are undertaken to protect the fuel and other radioactive material from theft or sabotage. There is a well-functioning system for physical protection during handling and transport. At the deep repository facility, the operations area will be fenced-in and watched by surveillance equipment in a similar manner as at other nuclear installations. Access to the area will be controlled and checked in a manner similar to what is done at the nuclear installations in operation today. No physical protection is needed in a sealed repository. Instead, monitoring can be coordinated with safeguards supervision via for example satellite surveillance. Conclusions in RD&D 2001 and its review In its review of RD&D 2001, SKI stated its opinion that the areas of safeguards and physical protection of the deep repository were described in very general terms and SKI maintained that high demands must be made with respect to both safeguards for the fissile material and physical protection of the same. SKB does not fully concur with this objection, since it is the inspection bodies Euratom, IAEA and SKI who design safeguards for the deep repository. SKB has a great interest in cooperating with the inspection bodies at an early stage in order to be able to adapt the design of the deep repository facility so that safeguards are facilitated. Newfound knowledge since RD&D 2001 The IAEA, Euratom and SKI collaborate in and organize international working groups for safeguards for both encapsulation and geological repositories for spent nuclear fuel. SKB believes that early cooperation with the inspection bodies on safeguards is important to ensure that the facilities are designed in such a way that safeguards are facilitated. By participating in the international working groups and “Esarda Working Group on the Back End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle” and “IAEA Experts Group on Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories”, SKB wishes to ensure an early exchange of information and cooperation. Among other things, the working groups have received information at the Äspö HRL about how handling of nuclear materials and deposition of canisters is planned to take place in the deep repository. SKB also informed the IAEA at a meeting in Oskarshamn /12-8/ how and what information is gathered during the site investigation phase. At the meeting, SKB also pointed out the opportunity which the collected information provides to the inspection bodies for obtaining Primary Baseline data, which may be needed in the future to identify changes that could indicate diversion of nuclear material. The whole issue of safeguards will be taken into account when designing the deep repository. Spaces for monitoring equipment etc are being planned in keeping with the viewpoints of the inspection bodies, and the facility is being designed with as much transparency as possible. The trend within safeguards is that traditional safeguards measures (seal, camera inspections, etc) will be supplemented or partially replaced by indirect controls such as measurements in the surrounding environment, gathering of open information and unannounced inspections. This trend will naturally influence the design of the safeguards system at the time of the permit application. An example of this trend is the so-called additional protocol /12-9/. Programme During the period 2005–2010, SKB will keep track of international developments in the field, but does not plan to conduct any development or demonstration of monitoring equipment or the like for the safeguards purposes of its own. 142 RD&D-Programme 2004
Part III Safety assessment and research 13 Overview – safety assessment and research 14 Safety assessment 15 Fuel 16 Canister as barrier 17 Buffer 18 Backfill 19 Geosphere 20 Biosphere 21 Climate 22 Social science research 23 Alternative methods
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Technical Report TR-04-21 RD&D-Prog
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Preface SKB, Svensk Kärnbränsleha
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welding and nondestructive testing
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Alternative methods. SKB is followi
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5.5 Nondestructive testing of canis
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15 Fuel 163 15.1 Initial state in f
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18.1.10 Swelling pressure 229 18.1.
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Part I SKB’s programme and plan o
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Nuclear power plant Clab m/s Sigyn
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Figure 1-2. The Äspö HRL consists
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Figure 1-4. Interior from the Canis
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Siting SKB’s main alternative is
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Transport tunnel KBS-3V Deposition
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2.1 Nuclear fuel programme In Swede
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Encapsulation plant 2003 2004 2005
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2.2 LILW programme Parts of the sys
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environment. The barriers can also
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this cooperation entails that the o
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4 Overview - technology development
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4.7 Design of the deep repository T
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Diameter 1,050 Diameter 949 Diamete
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Conclusions in RD&D 2001 and its re
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Figure 5-3. Graphite shapes in cast
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Figure 5-5. Positions for test bars
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Programme The development project c
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Programme Trial fabrication of all
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The technology and procedures for c
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A method and equipment based on las
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Spacer plate Defect A Defect B Chan
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Newfound knowledge since RD&D 2001
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2004 2005 Process model welding met
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6.2.2 The welding process In parall
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Figure 6-9. Lid weld L028. Section
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Tensile test bars have been taken o
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6.3.3 The welding process The param
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A limitation in the evaluation of t
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Nondestructive testing methods such
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a b Through-transmission Reflection
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simulation program, and the body of
Page 83 and 84: SKB has devised a quality system fo
Page 85 and 86: Newfound knowledge since RD&D 2001
Page 87 and 88: 8 Canister - encapsulation The desi
Page 89 and 90: Figure 8-2. Work stations in the en
Page 91 and 92: The filled canister transport casks
Page 93 and 94: Stages encapsulation plant 2003 200
Page 95 and 96: Figure 8-4. Possible location of a
Page 97 and 98: 9 Transportation of encapsulated fu
Page 99 and 100: 9.3 SKB’s transportation system -
Page 101 and 102: absorbs neutron radiation. The lid
Page 103 and 104: Applicable international and Swedis
Page 105 and 106: een specified yet. Since the size o
Page 107 and 108: • Methods exist for full-face dri
Page 109 and 110: Programme SKB keeps track of curren
Page 111 and 112: Judgement with regard to long-term
Page 113 and 114: Furthermore, it must not have an ad
Page 115 and 116: Studies of equipment will be conduc
Page 117 and 118: A third type of seal is intended to
Page 119 and 120: 10.6.1 Requirements and premises In
Page 121 and 122: the long-term safety of the concept
Page 125 and 126: Conclusions in RD&D 2001 and its re
Page 127 and 128: 11.3 Execution - stepwise design Si
Page 129 and 130: Programme Design step D, which incl
Page 131 and 132: 12 Deep repository - monitoring SKB
Page 133: • Trigger levels for action. •
Page 137 and 138: As a complement to the numerical mo
Page 139 and 140: Table 13-2. Research on the initial
Page 141 and 142: 13.2.4 Backfill Together with Posiv
Page 143 and 144: Table 13-3. Projects and experiment
Page 145 and 146: spent nuclear fuel. It was neverthe
Page 147 and 148: concepts or whose descriptions requ
Page 149 and 150: 14.2.2 Radionuclide transport and d
Page 151 and 152: At present, the computational time
Page 153 and 154: Inflow Nuclides in a soluble phase
Page 155 and 156: 15.1.2 Geometry The deep repository
Page 157 and 158: 7 6 BWR 55 MWd/tU PWR 42 MWd/tU PWR
Page 159 and 160: 15.1.11 Gas composition Conclusions
Page 161 and 162: 15.2.5 Heat transport Dealt with in
Page 163 and 164: simulating the repository environme
Page 165 and 166: 238 U 237 Np 239 Pu Concentration,
Page 167 and 168: The catalytic effect of uranium dio
Page 169 and 170: oxidant consumption in the bulk sol
Page 171 and 172: The influence of hydrogen peroxide
Page 173 and 174: A research programme to study cast
Page 177 and 178: 16.2.3 Heat transport No new knowle
Page 179 and 180: Programme The ongoing experiments w
Page 183 and 184: Programme Short-term tests aimed at
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Swelling properties The buffer must
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have been performed for some ten co
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17.1.13 Impurity levels Bentonite i
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out when the buffer swells, but our
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These processes have been studied i
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• The gas injection phase will be
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19 9 D=205 d=175 D=172 d=170 D=168
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• Tests of the wetting process cl
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Figure 17-4. Natural redox front in
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These phenomena have been studied b
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17.2.24 Radionuclide transport - ad
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Programme SKB does not consider sor
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18.1.6 Smectite content SKB, togeth
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Programme See section 18.2.2. 18.1.
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The wetting of the backfill from th
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ackfill must have a compression mod
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Programme See section 17.2.17. 18.2
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18.2.23 Radionuclide transport - so
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10 -5 I-129 Release rate (moles/yea
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and the rock matrix, is also crucia
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A thermal model will be constructed
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In a continuation of the super-regi
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A thorough overview has been done o
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The authorities are of the opinion
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19.2.11 Advection/mixing - groundwa
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a so-called Markov-directed Random
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Diffusion measurements in the labor
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Uranium series analyses from clay-
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19.2.18 Microbial processes Conclus
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19.2.20 Colloid formation - colloid
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19.2.23 Methane ice formation Concl
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19.2.26 Integrated modelling - radi
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development that has taken place ha
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20.2 Review of RD&D 2001 Following
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work will continue, particularly in
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2 In Sea (mol) 3 Water Sea (mol/m 3
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The above work will be pursued in c
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certain substances, such as uranium
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In connection with the Safe project
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20.9 International work and dissemi
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the underlying material are current
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These reports describe dominant fun
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Glacial Permafrost Permafrost Borea
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Shoreline displacement has an isost
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The hydromechanical modellings that
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model that includes these factors a
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The salinity of the sea, inland sea
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• Public opinion and attitudes -
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Socioeconomic impact • Local deve
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Previously existing material is bei
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• The driving forces behind the d
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• Very effective methods for tran
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• A subcritical nuclear reactor w
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out in Cadarache, France. Hindas an
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Important results since 2001 includ
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Programme The goal of SKB’s resea
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Kasam says that disposal in Very De
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24 Decommissioning The facilities c
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SKB is responsible for management a
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25 Low- and intermediate-level wast
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25.2.1 Repository for short-lived L
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Programme Work on the design of the
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observation is that isosaccharinic
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stored so that the material can be
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6-4 Claesson S, 2004. Elektronstrå
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Chapter 14 14-1 SKB, 2004. Interim
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15-42 Ekeroth E, Jonsson M, 2003. O
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17-19 Le Bell J C, 1978. Colloid ch
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19-29 Hudson J (ed), 2002. Strategy
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19-77 Bath A, Milodowski A, Ruotsal
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20-19 Kautsky U (ed), 2001. The bio
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20-73 Blomqvist P, Jansson P-E, Esp
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20-119 Berggren J, Kyläkorpi L, 20
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23-10 NEA, 2002. Accelerator-driven
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SKB’s master plan Appendix A
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A1 Introduction A1.1 Background The
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generations unnecessarily. Another
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Encapsulation plant 2003 2004 2005
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facilitated by the fact that the re
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A2.3 System design A2.3.1 Fundament
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The system analyses will be largely
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Two safety reports will therefore b
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KBS-3H Basic Design Detailed engine
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Time horizon 2017 The current phase
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Phase
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In the subsequent phase, verificati
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The canister development work will
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Deep repository Year 2003 2004 2005
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A4.2 Site investigations Site inves
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Already in the feasibility study, l
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In step D2, the facility descriptio
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Table 4. Current situation and prel
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2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Desig
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Table 5. Continued. Technology issu
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A4.6.1 Siting factors Before priori
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A possible alternative scenario is
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of the NPPs starts, however, long-l
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Between now and 2008, an organizati
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Appendix B Abbreviations Abaqus ACL
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GIA Gis Goldsim Hindas HMC HPF HRL
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PMMA POD Posiva Prism Proper Protot
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ISSN 1404-0344 CM Digitaltryck AB,
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