Bloom's Literary Themes - ymerleksi - home
Bloom's Literary Themes - ymerleksi - home
Bloom's Literary Themes - ymerleksi - home
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Julius Caesar 67<br />
effect suggestive of the savage notion that one’s name is “an essential<br />
part and an important possession of his personality” (75).<br />
The fundamental taboo in Freud’s scheme involves the vengeful<br />
spirit of the slain father, wandering like Caesar’s ghost. Freud maintains<br />
that taboos develop within animistic cultures and he traces<br />
animism itself to primitive observations of the dead and to the experience<br />
of dreaming. People for whom immortality is “self-evident”<br />
(100) understand dreams to be adventures of the unencumbered soul,<br />
prefigurations of the larger adventure of death. Believing human<br />
beings to “have souls which can leave their habitation,” which are<br />
“bearers of spiritual activities and are, to a certain extent, independent<br />
of the ‘bodies’ ” (99), animists extrapolate that animals, plants, and<br />
objects also have souls, and that some souls may become free, in which<br />
case they are called spirits. Animists “do not conceal the fact that they<br />
fear the presence and the return of the spirit of a dead person” (77).<br />
After the murder of the primal father, taboos develop in the attempt<br />
to exculpate the wrath of the father’s spirit. Yet this is only a partial<br />
explanation, for taboo outlives the belief in spirits in the form of the<br />
“sense of guilt of the son” (185). The spirit of the father is eventually<br />
internalized as taboo or totem law, although according to Freud it was<br />
not always so.<br />
In order to account for a historical difference, Freud must posit a<br />
fundamental change in human consciousness. Accordingly, he supposes<br />
primitive experience to be directed outward, with “inner perceptions”<br />
projected “to the outside” by a “primitive mechanism” (85), “perhaps<br />
genetically connected” with the creature’s original attention to the<br />
world outside the self. Hostile impulses were automatically projected<br />
onto others, for the concurrent absence of language and of abstract<br />
thought made introspection impossible.<br />
Only within the development of the language of abstract<br />
thought through the association of sensory remnants of word<br />
representations with inner processes, did the latter gradually<br />
become capable of perception. Before this took place primitive<br />
man had developed a picture of the outer world through the<br />
outward projection of inner perceptions, which we, with our<br />
reinforced conscious perception, must now translate back into<br />
psychology. (85–86)