Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

More documents

Recommendations

Info

THANOS DOKOS, THEODORE TSAKIRIS 102 TAP/SOUTHERN CORRIDOR AND GREECE: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS THANOS DOKOS DIRECTOR, HELLENIC FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN & FOREIGN POLICY (ELIAMEP) THEODORE TSAKIRIS HEAD, THE ENERGY PROGRAMME ELIAMEP ASSISTANT PROFESSOR FOR GEOPOLITICS & HYDROCARBONS, UNIVERSITY OF NICOSIA
The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Italy via Greece and Albania, will contribute to European energy security. The global energy landscape is changing, shaped by shifting patterns of demand, new reserves entering the production stage (including, of course, the “shale gas revolution” in the U.S.), new players, alignments and evolving rules. Natural and man-made disasters (such as Fukushima), the EU economic crisis and geopolitical crises in Ukraine, Libya, Nigeria and Iraq also continue to influence the energy sector and the global economy in key ways. The question of European energy security and the need to diversify Europe’s natural gas suppliers focused attention on the strategic significance of Southeastern Europe as a transport hub for natural gas from the <strong>Caspian</strong> region, and potentially the Eastern Mediterranean. In order to meet increasing natural gas demand and reduce East and South East Europe’s high levels of energy dependency on a single exporter, namely Russia, European authorities have been keen to promote projects that contribute to supply diversification. 1 In this context, the Southern Gas Corridor has an important role. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will transport natural gas from Azerbaijan to Italy via Greece and Albania, will contribute to European energy security as well as providing a major boost for Greece’s economy, regional standing and ability to emerge as a leading transit hub on a Southern- Northern Axis. The combination of TAP with a series of interconnecting pipelines linking the Aegean with the Baltic Sea, starting with Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria (IGB), will be key. Europe’s Southern Gas Corridor Strategy is based on the need to maximize imports of non-Russian gas via non-Russian controlled territory, so as to establish a third, following Russia, Norway and Northern Africa (Algeria, Libya, Egypt), route of supply diversification. As potential sources of supply for the Southern Gas Corridor, the European Commission has recognised not only <strong>Caspian</strong> (Azerbaijan) and Central Asian gas (Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and primarily Turkmenistan) but also Middle Eastern gas from Iraq’s future production as well as from the potential expansion of Egyptian net exports, although the political 1. EU’s primary energy security goals should be to reduce the strategic dependence of individual Member-States on single external suppliers and to ensure that energy markets are liquid, open and functioning according to stable market rules rather than power logics. Of course, energy security needs also needs to be balanced against environmental and economic competitiveness concerns. (Dreyer & Stang, EU-ISS, p. 5)
Page 1:
CASPIAN PUBLISHED BY CASPIAN STRATE
Page 4 and 5:
Dear Readers, CASPIAN REPORT 2 It i
Page 6 and 7:
CASPIAN CASPIAN REPORT 4 06 FATIH M
Page 8 and 9:
FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 6 THE U.S.
Page 10 and 11:
FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 8 shale rev
Page 12 and 13:
FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 10 in the 1
Page 14 and 15:
FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 12 SINCE TH
Page 16 and 17:
FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 14 these tw
Page 18 and 19:
FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 16 LNG’s
Page 20 and 21:
FATIH MACIT, HOLLY REHM 18 kets, pa
Page 22 and 23:
MANFRED HAFNER 20 THE SOUTHERN GAS
Page 24 and 25:
MANFRED HAFNER 22 THE DOCUMENT RECO
Page 26 and 27:
MANFRED HAFNER 24 Notwithstanding t
Page 28 and 29:
MANFRED HAFNER 26 TANAP, A PROJECTE
Page 30 and 31:
MANFRED HAFNER 28 by the Shah Deniz
Page 32 and 33:
MANFRED HAFNER 30 Snam Rete Gas has
Page 34 and 35:
MANFRED HAFNER 32 THE ESTABLISHMENT
Page 36 and 37:
MATTEO VERDA 34 LNG MARKET: TRENDS
Page 38 and 39:
MATTEO VERDA 36 traditionally accou
Page 40 and 41:
MATTEO VERDA 38 bcm), Brunei (9 bcm
Page 42 and 43:
MATTEO VERDA 40 for transport vesse
Page 44 and 45:
MATTEO VERDA 42 of the global LNG m
Page 46 and 47:
MUBARIZ HASANOV 44 AN OVERVIEW OF E
Page 48 and 49:
MUBARIZ HASANOV 46 Figure 1. Primar
Page 50 and 51:
MUBARIZ HASANOV 48 Figure 4. Real c
Page 52 and 53:
Figure 7. Price of transport fuels
Page 54 and 55: Figure 10. Electricity generation i
Page 56 and 57: Figure 13. Breakdown of electricity
Page 58 and 59: THE SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR - WINDOW
Page 60 and 61: NINO KALANDADZE 58 become comprise
Page 62 and 63: NINO KALANDADZE 60 This picture mak
Page 64 and 65: NINO KALANDADZE 62 Security policy.
Page 66 and 67: NINO KALANDADZE 64 There are benefi
Page 68 and 69: NINO KALANDADZE 66 tion of Crimea b
Page 70 and 71: RADU DUDAU 68 THE UKRAINE CRISIS: L
Page 72 and 73: RADU DUDAU 70 RUSSIA HAS FREQUENTLY
Page 74 and 75: RADU DUDAU 72 Russia, which depends
Page 76 and 77: RADU DUDAU 74 WHAT INTERNATIONAL LA
Page 78 and 79: RADU DUDAU 76 THE NEAR FUTURE WILL
Page 80 and 81: RADU DUDAU 78 THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNM
Page 82 and 83: RADU DUDAU 80 parliament decided to
Page 84 and 85: Black Sea Serpents’ Island. RADU
Page 86 and 87: RADU DUDAU 84 (where Russia holds v
Page 88 and 89: RADU DUDAU 86 IN TERMS OF ENERGY, A
Page 90 and 91: WHY RUSSIA SIGNED A MAJOR GAS CONTR
Page 92 and 93: MESUT HAKKI CASIN 90 I will focus o
Page 94 and 95: Russian President Vladimir Putin sh
Page 96 and 97: Figure II: Russian energy infrastru
Page 98 and 99: Kazakhstan President Nursultan Naza
Page 100 and 101: MESUT HAKKI CASIN 98 economic devel
Page 102 and 103: Figure IV: China’s gas import sou
Page 106 and 107: THANOS DOKOS, THEODORE TSAKIRIS 104
Page 116 and 117: ARZU YORKAN 114 TURKEY’S RENEWABL
Page 118 and 119: ARZU YORKAN 116 is 12 th in the wor
Page 120 and 121: Figure 4: Solar Energy Potential At
Page 122 and 123: ARZU YORKAN 120 Figure 8: The share
Page 124 and 125: ARZU YORKAN 122 THE STRATEGY PAPER
Page 126 and 127: ARZU YORKAN 124 TURKEY HAS NOT YET
Page 128 and 129: CASPIAN
Page 130 and 131: THE EU AGREEMENT ON THE 2030 FRAMEW
Page 132 and 133: EU Commission President Jean Claude
Page 134 and 135: ROMAN RUKOMEDA 132 THE PHANTOM OF R
Page 136 and 137: Russia’s gas giant Gazprom CEO, A
Page 138: CASPIAN CALL FOR PAPERS 136 Caspian
show all

Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?