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Court’s By-laws establish the principle<br />
of authority of res judicata in<br />
Article 60, Article 61 provides for a<br />
re-examination of a decision in certain<br />
conditions, provided that “any<br />
decisive factors unfamiliar to the<br />
Court while issuing such decision<br />
are identified.” However, the secession<br />
and annexation of Crimea to the<br />
Russian Federation could not represent,<br />
by any reasonable interpretation,<br />
an “identification of facts.”<br />
Therefore, if Russia decides not<br />
to observe the ICJ decision in the<br />
Ukraine vs. Romania case, the question<br />
of ensuring compliance with/<br />
enforcement of the decision would<br />
be raised, assuming eventual enforceability<br />
by the UN Security<br />
Council, in which Russia holds veto<br />
powers.<br />
Another possible path would be for<br />
Russia to impede economic activities<br />
conducted in Romania’s EEZ by<br />
raising economic and environmental<br />
claims related to any E&P for oil<br />
and in the Romanian perimeters.<br />
The Treaty on friendly relationships<br />
and cooperation between Romania<br />
and the Russian Federation of 4 July<br />
2003, ratified on 27 August 2004,<br />
provides in Article 8 that the parties<br />
will cooperate in the field of environmental<br />
protection in the Black Sea<br />
and for the rational use of the sea’s<br />
resources. By virtue of such a provision<br />
and through potentially contentious<br />
discussions, Russia could<br />
claim that the Romanian petroleum<br />
activities damage the marine environment.<br />
In the unlikely event that<br />
such matters ever become critical,<br />
Russia could impose manu militari<br />
a suspension of petroleum operations,<br />
seriously affecting Romania’s<br />
energy security.<br />
Another dimension that is potentially<br />
conducive to Russian intervention<br />
in the petroleum activities of Romania’s<br />
EEZ is the absence of intergovernmental<br />
unitization 13 agreements<br />
between Romania and Ukraine (assuming<br />
that they would be taken<br />
over by Russia by virtue of the prin-<br />
85<br />
CASPIAN REPORT, FALL <strong>2014</strong><br />
13.<br />
The best example to be followed is the treaty between the UK and Norway, which regulates an<br />
intergovernmental framework for promoting institutional cooperation in the joint development<br />
of blocs in the North Sea.
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