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THANOS DOKOS, THEODORE TSAKIRIS<br />
1<strong>08</strong><br />
Natural Gas Market Structure – Partially State controlled Actors 13<br />
An increase in the market’s liquidity<br />
as a result of the US shale gas revolution<br />
pushed spot LNG prices below<br />
European long-term contracts<br />
prices, which in turn helped Greek<br />
importers of LNG expand their business.<br />
By 2013, private LNG imports<br />
expanded to cover around 10% of<br />
national demand thereby providing<br />
the country with a considerable<br />
margin of supply security. In the absence<br />
of a strategic gas storage facility,<br />
Greece will remain dependent on<br />
the flexibility of its LNG importers<br />
in facing the challenge of another<br />
potential Ukrainian transit crisis,<br />
which would entirely sever its Russian<br />
imports.<br />
In this regard, the realisation of<br />
TAP and in particular the launch of<br />
Azerbaijani exports from Shah Deniz<br />
Phase 2 from 2019 will considerably<br />
enhance the ability of Greece to cope<br />
with future supply crises. Especially<br />
if DEPA extends its BOTAS contract<br />
beyond 2021, Azerbaijani exports<br />
will add a fifth source of supplies<br />
which would improve Greece’s negotiating<br />
leverage with all of its<br />
existing suppliers. DEPA’s 25-year<br />
contract of 1 bcm with the Shah<br />
Deniz and TAP consortia was signed<br />
in September 2013 and marks the<br />
most important and most tangible<br />
success in Greek pipeline diplomacy<br />
in more than a decade.<br />
During the January 2009 Russian-<br />
Ukrainian gas crisis, Greece managed<br />
to cover its needs following the<br />
loss of its Turkish imports by securing<br />
two emergency LNG shipments.<br />
In less than two weeks, LNG imports,<br />
which before the crises had constituted<br />
just 20% of total supplies, expanded<br />
to cover almost 100% of demand.<br />
It is unclear whether Greece<br />
will be able to repeat its successful<br />
management of the 2009 crisis during<br />
the winter of <strong>2014</strong>-2015, if Russia<br />
cuts off European exports via<br />
Ukraine.<br />
The agreement and TAP’s link to<br />
TANAP further enhances Greek-<br />
Turkish energy interdependence<br />
and cooperation, as well as increasing<br />
DEPA’s flexibility in view of the<br />
renegotiation of its principal supply<br />
contract with Gazprom (due to<br />
expire in 2016). The aggregate net<br />
import price paid by Greek gas consumers<br />
is likely to decrease, since<br />
Shah Deniz gas is expected to be less<br />
expensive than the Gazprom and<br />
BOTAS contracts and considerably<br />
more attractive than Sonatrach’s inflexible<br />
LNG prices.<br />
13.<br />
Paparsenos, ibid.