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Caspian Report - Issue: 08 - Fall 2014

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THANOS DOKOS, THEODORE TSAKIRIS<br />

1<strong>08</strong><br />

Natural Gas Market Structure – Partially State controlled Actors 13<br />

An increase in the market’s liquidity<br />

as a result of the US shale gas revolution<br />

pushed spot LNG prices below<br />

European long-term contracts<br />

prices, which in turn helped Greek<br />

importers of LNG expand their business.<br />

By 2013, private LNG imports<br />

expanded to cover around 10% of<br />

national demand thereby providing<br />

the country with a considerable<br />

margin of supply security. In the absence<br />

of a strategic gas storage facility,<br />

Greece will remain dependent on<br />

the flexibility of its LNG importers<br />

in facing the challenge of another<br />

potential Ukrainian transit crisis,<br />

which would entirely sever its Russian<br />

imports.<br />

In this regard, the realisation of<br />

TAP and in particular the launch of<br />

Azerbaijani exports from Shah Deniz<br />

Phase 2 from 2019 will considerably<br />

enhance the ability of Greece to cope<br />

with future supply crises. Especially<br />

if DEPA extends its BOTAS contract<br />

beyond 2021, Azerbaijani exports<br />

will add a fifth source of supplies<br />

which would improve Greece’s negotiating<br />

leverage with all of its<br />

existing suppliers. DEPA’s 25-year<br />

contract of 1 bcm with the Shah<br />

Deniz and TAP consortia was signed<br />

in September 2013 and marks the<br />

most important and most tangible<br />

success in Greek pipeline diplomacy<br />

in more than a decade.<br />

During the January 2009 Russian-<br />

Ukrainian gas crisis, Greece managed<br />

to cover its needs following the<br />

loss of its Turkish imports by securing<br />

two emergency LNG shipments.<br />

In less than two weeks, LNG imports,<br />

which before the crises had constituted<br />

just 20% of total supplies, expanded<br />

to cover almost 100% of demand.<br />

It is unclear whether Greece<br />

will be able to repeat its successful<br />

management of the 2009 crisis during<br />

the winter of <strong>2014</strong>-2015, if Russia<br />

cuts off European exports via<br />

Ukraine.<br />

The agreement and TAP’s link to<br />

TANAP further enhances Greek-<br />

Turkish energy interdependence<br />

and cooperation, as well as increasing<br />

DEPA’s flexibility in view of the<br />

renegotiation of its principal supply<br />

contract with Gazprom (due to<br />

expire in 2016). The aggregate net<br />

import price paid by Greek gas consumers<br />

is likely to decrease, since<br />

Shah Deniz gas is expected to be less<br />

expensive than the Gazprom and<br />

BOTAS contracts and considerably<br />

more attractive than Sonatrach’s inflexible<br />

LNG prices.<br />

13.<br />

Paparsenos, ibid.

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